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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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REPLY BRIEF
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v.
CASE NO.

880402
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Defendants.
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GOOSEBERRY ESTATES, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
HARRY THORSEN and DONALD GATES,
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INTRODUCTION
Thorsen had the right to maintain his easement in its
historical size and condition.

Thus, a critical issue which must

be resolved prior to a measure of damages, if any are owed to
respondents

(hereinafter

referred

to as Gooseberry),

is a

determination of the size and extent of the easement which
existed prior to any damage to Gooseberry's property.

The damage

suffered by the respondents is limited to the impact on the
property

resulting

from the enlargement of the easement as

opposed to the original easement itself.
The size or capacity of the original easement was never
addressed by Gooseberry at trial, in their motion to reassess
damages, or in their brief which is submitted for purposes of
this appeal.
This Court, however, in Thorsen I stated:
Esplin's appraisal was also flawed because it was
based on his assumption that no one had a lawful
irrigation ditch easement through the "lots." This
was erroneous.
As previously mentioned, at oral
argument of this case before this Court, counsel for
Gooseberry Estates admitted that the trial court did
not find an abandonment and that Thorsen had an
easement for the irrigation ditch.
Thorsen v. Johnson, 745 P 2d 1243, 1246 (Utah 1947) (attached as
Addendum "E").
The

evidence

demonstrating

both

presented
the

at

existence

trial
of

historical size of the lower "B" ditch.

the

is

abundant

easement

in

and the

This sets the point for

comparison and upon comparison it becomes evident that Gooseberry
suffered minor damage at best.
POINT I
BEFORE ANY APPROPRIATE AMOUNT OF DAMAGE CAN BE DETERMINED
THE SIZE AND EXTENT OF THE ORIGINAL EASEMENT ACROSS GOOSEBERRY'S
PROPERTY IN FAVOR OF THORSEN MUST BE ASCERTAINED.
The Iowa Supreme Court in Nixon v. Welch, 24 NW 2d 146
(Iowa, 1946) (attached as Addendum "A") rendered a decision which
is widely accepted and often quoted as authority for the extent
2

of easements relating specifically to the rights and duties of
owners of water rights.
The Court discussed the rights a dominant estate has to
enter upon the servient estate to maintain and clean a waterway
easement such as a ditch.

In quoting from Roberts v. Roberts,

55 NY 275, the Court stated:
If the ditch got out of repair by reason of floods or
washing away its banks or otherwise, it was the legal
right of the plaintiff to repair it so as to restore
it to its original condition and make it subserve the
purpose which it originally effected, of carrying off
water of the stream.
He was entitled to have the
ditch kept up as it was when he purchased, and to
keep it in that condition, and if necessary, to enter
upon the defendant's lands to make repairs, doing no
unnecessary injury. (Emphasis added)
Nixon at 1145.
The Utah Supreme Court in Holm v. Davis, 125 P 403 (Utah, 1912)
(attached as Addendum "B") quotes from Jones on easements:
The owner of a dominant estate having an easement
has a right to enter upon the servient estate and
make repairs necessary for the reasonable and
convenient use of the easement, doing no
unnecessary injury to the servient estate.
The Court in Nixon also stated:
To illustrate: "A person having an easement in a
ditch running through the land of another may go upon
the servient land and use so much thereof on either
side of the ditch as may be required to make all
necessary repairs and to clean out the ditch at all
reasonable times; he is liable only for the abuse of
this right. It has also been held that the right of
access is not limited to purposes of repairs, but may
3

be exercised to make original constructions necessary
for the enjoyment of the easement.
Nixon at 1146.
The standard applied pursuant to the authority cited supra,
is that the size of the easement granted to Thorsen should be
sufficient "to subserve the purpose which it originally effected
of carrying off the water of the stream".
Harry Thorsen was secretary

and treasurer of Gooseberry

Creek Irrigation Company at the time of the cleaning of the ditch
and had held the position of secretary/treasurer for some 15 to
20 years prior to the cleaning of the ditch.
455).

(Transcript page

Gooseberry Creek Irrigation Company is entitled, according

to the Cox Decree, to a maximum of 26 and 45/100 second feet of
water and is entitled to a minimum of 17 second feet out of
Gooseberry Creek (Transcript page 458).

The Gooseberry Creek

irrigation system is divided into an "A" ditch section, a "B"
ditch section and a "C" ditch section. (Transcript page 458).

At

those times of the year when the flow of the river is at its
maximum the water is split evenly to each of the three sections,
thus, one-third of the 26 and 45/100 second feet, or eight to
nine second feet of water, would be sent down the "B" ditch
section. (Transcript Page 459).

At the time of the cleaning of

the ditch which Gooseberry asserts increased the size of the
easement and thereby gave rise to these proceedings, the "B"
4

ditch section came down a single ditch and at a point was
diverted between what has been referred to as the upper "B" ditch
or the "B" ditch extension and the lower "B" ditch which is the
ditch of concern in this litigation.
POINT II
THE TESTIMONY AT TRIAL ESTABLISHES THE HISTORICAL CAPACITY
AND DIMENSIONS OF THE LOWER "B" DITCH AS HAVING AND
CARRYING CAPACITY OF SEVEN TO TEN SECOND FEET OF WATER
AND BEING THREE FEET WIDE.
Allen K. Nielson.

Allen K. Nielson, a consulting engineer

for which Gooseberry stipulated was a licensed engineer and an
expert witness in the field testified:
Q: Allen, have you had occasion to inspect the soil
conservation records concerning what has been
referred to in this litigation as the lower "B" ditch
on the Johnson property at Gooseberry?
A:

Yes, I have.

Q:

When did you do that?

A:

This morning.

Q: And what did those records show with regard to
the history of the lower -- what we call the lower
ditch?
A:
Well, it shows that originally being the
Gooseberry water user's canal and, as far as the
record showed, it has never been abandoned.
(Transcript page 450).
Ted Bird.

Ted Bird's family owned the property which is

currently owned by Gooseberry Estates.
5

The Birds resided on the

Gooseberry property until 1937 at which time Ted Bird's family
sold the property.

Mr. Bird was born in 1911.

He recalls going

to the lower "B" ditch as a boy and also Mr. Bird testified that
from

1930

until

1937 he

had

the

duty

of

irrigating

the

Gooseberry property.
When asked about the size and capacity of the ditch prior to
the time they sold the property in 1937, Ted Bird testified:
Q:

How wide?

A: Well, I would say that it was right around three
foot wide, but that at that time it wasn't too deep.
Q:

How deep?

A: Well, I would say it wasn't over one foot. I use
to take a little dipper to get a gallon, to dip it
out, to get a gallon of water.
Q:

O.k.

A: And that went along as long as until the folks
moved away from Gooseberry.
Q: Now, how much water would you
up to the time
your folks moved away, how much water would you put
down the lower "B" ditch.
A:

We put it all.

Q:

And what do you mean by "all".

A:

Well, we put all of Gooseberry Creek.

. . .

A:
Well, I think in the Spring of the year you
could turn ten feet of water in there.
(Transcript, page 548).
6

Harry Thorsen,

In 1944, Harry Thorsen acquired the property

which he currently owns and which was irrigated by the lower "B"
ditch.

(Transcript, page 456).

At the time Mr. Thorsen acquired

the property he purchased 14 shares of water in the lower "B"
ditch

and

five

shares

of water

in the

upper

"B" ditch.

(Transcript, page 457).
As to the amount of water which was sent down the lower "B"
ditch historically, Harry Thorsen testified:
Q: Assuming that a normal average year, what would
be the most water you could take down the lower "B"
ditch in the high season.
A:

In the high season?

Q: Yes.
A: Well, in the earlier days, we would take out six
or seven feet down there. (Transcript, page 461).
Mr. Thorsen testified that from the year he purchased the
property up until 1978 when the property was leased to Clayton
Crane, the lower "B" ditch was used every year:
Q: From 1944 to 1978 when you leased the property to
Clayton Crane, was there any year that you didn't use
the lower "B" ditch.
A: Oh, no.
462).

We always used it.

Eric Allen Thorsen.

(Transcript, page

Allen Thorsen is the son of Harry

Thorsen who testified that prior to his graduation from high
school in 1959, that he assisted his father on the ranch and
7

recalled several of the structures, including the flume in the
ditch and also recalls helping his father take water down the
lower "B" ditch.

(Transcript, pages 502 to 504).

In 1967, Allen Thorsen moved back to the ranch and assisted
his father in the actual ranching and irrigation of the property
full time until 1972.

Since 1972, Allen Thorsen has been on the

property on several occasions. He testified that there was water
in the ditch each year between 1967 and 1972 and even beyond that
time when he was on the property.

(Transcript, page 504).

When questioned about the historical dimension of the ditch,
Allen Thorsen testified as follows:
Q: How would you describe the ditch back in those
early years with respect to size and its appearance?
A: I would say three feet wide and at least a couple
of feet deep on an average. (Transcript, page 504).
Bob Robbins.

Bob Robbins was an individual who leased

the Gooseberry property on which the lower "B" ditch and the
easement is located during the years 1974 through 1978.
Q:

Did you see water running through that ditch?

A: Yes.
Q:

All the way?

A: Yes.
Q:

To the Thorsen property?

A: Yes.
8

A: . . . 1 made a shutter out of one solid piece of
metal with a handle on it, and when I put that down
in front of that pipe, I took the whole creek, all
the water.
Q:

Down the lower "B" ditch?

A:

Down the lower "B" ditch?

Q:

And how much would that be? . . .

A:

I'm sure we would have to have over ten feet. . .

Transcript, pages 515 - 517.
CIayton Crane.

Clayton Crane was the individual who leased

the Thorsen property subsequent to 1978.

Clayton testified that

he used the ditch in the Spring of 1978 and water was brought to
the Thorsen property

through the lower

"B" ditch in 1978.

(Transcript, page 422). He said that due to the forces of nature
it was so difficult to bring the ditch down the lower "B" ditch
that the ditch would need to be cleaned prior to further use.
(Transcript, page 423).
POINT III
THE IMPROVEMENTS LOCATED IN THE DITCH ITSELF EVIDENCE
THE HISTORICAL CARRYING CAPACITY OF THE DITCH AS
SEVEN TO TEN SECOND FEET AND THE WIDTH AS THREE FEET.
Two engineers testified on behalf of Thorsen relating to the
improvements located in the lower "B,f ditch and the amount of
water which could be carried through each of the structures.
9

Paul Landell testified that structure number one would carry
11.6 cubic feet per second, structure number two would carry ten
cubic feet per second and that structure three would carry 7.1
cubic feet per second.

(Transcript, pages 390 to 391).

Allen Nelson, who Gooseberry

stipulated was a licensed

engineer and an expert witness, testified that he also measured
the first two structures in the lower "B" ditch and testified
that the carrying capacity of both structures exceeded 11 cubic
feet per second.

(Transcript, pages 451 to 452).

The testimony given at trial establishes that the historical
carrying capacity of the ditch was between seven to ten cubic
feet of water.

As it relates to the actual dimensions of the

ditch itself, the testimony is consistent that the ditch itself
encompassed at least three feet in width.
POINT IV
THORSEN HAS USED EQUIPMENT ON THE DITCH TO MAINTAIN AND
REPAIR IT ON AN ALMOST ANNUAL BASIS AND IN DOING SO
HAS MAINTAINED THE DITCH WITH DIMENSIONS OF MORE THAN
THREE FEET IN WIDTH AND TWO AND ONE-HALF FEET IN DEPTH.
Harry Thorsen, Allen Thorsen, and Ted Bird, all testified
that on almost an annual basis, both the south and north end of
the lower "B" ditch were cleaned and maintained by the use of a
piece of equipment called a "V".
A: . . .We've got two "V", one is a big one and one
is a little one.
10

Q:

Would you describe each of them?

A: Yes. I measured them here the other day because
we've still got those ditchers and the large one is
67" wide and six feet long. The smaller one is 41"
wide and it is six feet long and we would put these
on a tractor and drag them behind a tractor. Usually
it would take several passes.
Well, we would use the ditchers where the ditch
silted up and the two places that would give us any
problem would be the upper part and lower part of the
ditch.
That is where the silt seemed to go. We
would get a flood down Coal Canyon or somewhere and
we would find the ditch was filling up and would have
to work on it a little and we would make several
passes, and, when we would go up there, why we'd have
this case 530 and put the big ditcher on that
tractor and then we'd go through it and stand the
ditcher right up on its nose, and go through and
start, and then we'd make two or three passes, and we
would lower the ditcher down and widen the ditch out
with the ditcher on each sequential pass that we
would make.
Q: And what depth and width would you get in that
process?
A: I would say we would go at least two and one-half
feet and maybe better than three feet wide.
(Emphasis added).
Q:

And how far to the side would you throw dirt?

A: I don't know, it's hard to say.
feet, three feet maybe.

Maybe a couple

Transcript, Pages 506 and 507. (See also Transcript page 467 and
also Transcript page 554).
The

purpose

for

which

the

easement

was

originally

established was for the carrying of water with a maximum of seven
to ten cubic feet per second and that historically the dimensions
11

of the ditch were three feet wide and one to two and one-half
feet deep.
The Utah Supreme Court in Holm v. Davis, 125 P 403 (Utah
1912), dealt with an easement by which water was taken to the
Davis property through a ditch over Holm's property.

Like the

case at hand, the easement in Holm v. Davis was established long
before Holm and Davis acquired their property rights.

The Utah

Supreme Court in Holm stated:
The fact, therefore, that the canal was on the land
and was being used for the purposes aforesaid was
notice to the respondent that it was a structure of a
permanent character used for purposes permanent in
their nature, and hence he purchased the land subject
to the rights of the owner of the canal.
If the
right to use the same, therefore, had ripened into a
prescriptive right by the lapse of time and the
character of its use, respondent purchased and holds
the land subject to appellant's right to maintain and
use the canal for the purposes for which it was
constructed, maintained and used from its inception.
(Emphasis added).
Holm at page 406.
The Utah Supreme Court went on to say:
« . . We are of the opinion, that, although a canal,
ditch or flume may have been constructed by a person
on or over lands owned by another with the consent or
permission of each such other owner, yet if the owner
of the canal, ditch, or flume, or his assignee, has
used and maintained the same in the same manner as if
they same were constructed over his own lands, and
where such use and maintenance has continued
uninterruptedly, and under a claim of right for more
than twenty years, in such event, the owner of the
ditch has acquired a right to use and maintain the
same perpetually as an easement.
12

Holm at 406 to 407.
POINT V
THE COURT MAY TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE THAT AS AN INCIDENT
TO THE REASONABLE ENJOYMENT OF AN EASEMENT IN A DITCH THAT
THERE IS ASSUMED A SUFFICIENT DISTANCE ON EACH SIDE OF THE
DITCH FOR BANKS AND FURTHER, THAT AN ADEQUATE DISTANCE IS
ALLOWED FOR ACCESS AND MAINTENANCE BEYOND THE THREE FOOT WIDTH.
The United States District Court for the District of Utah,
Northern Division, in United States v. 3.08 Acres of Land, Etc.,
209 F. Supp. 652 (Utah, N.D. 1962) (attached as Addendum "C"),
resolved a dispute between the United States of America and Utah
Power & Light Company over certain property rights and easement
rights relating to the Willard Canal, Weber Basin project, Utah.
The Court determined that in order for one to enjoy the full and
proper rights granted under an easement that an easement for a
canal or a ditch would also include banks along the side of the
water way and access for purposes of maintenance:
I think it is a matter of common knowledge of which
the court may take judicial notice that canals in
addition to bottoms and sides frequently, if not
invariably, have banks. It is reasonable to suppose
that the legislature in making provision for
reservation of rights of way for canals contemplated
that easements so reserved would be for the purpose
of constructing and maintaining banks of canals among
other things.
In this mountainous region where
hydrolic gradient must be maintained over irregular
terrain it may not be supposed that the maintenance
of canals without banks necessarily was contemplated.
On the contrary, not only may banks of some sort be
deemed reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the
13

easement reserved in favor of the government, but we
must accept them as within the contemplation of the
statutes reserving the easement.
U.S. at 657.
The Supreme Court of Montana stated in Laden et al. v.
Atkeson, 116 P 2d 881 (Mont. 1941) (attached as Addendum "D")
that as part of

an easement

easement which allows one

there also exists a secondary

sufficient area on each side of a

ditch or waterway to establish access to the waterway and to
maintain the easement:
The right to enter upon the servant tenement for the
purpose of repairing or renewing an artificial
structure, constituting an easement, is called a
"secondary easement".
A mere incident of the
easement that passes by express or implied grant, or
is acquired by prescription.
2 Thompson on Real
Property, page 343; 19 C.J. Section 208, page 970; 26
Cal. Jar. Page 163 and Jones on Easements Section 811
and 812, pages 653, 654. To illustrate: "A person
having an easement in a ditch running through the
land of another may go upon the servient land and use
so much thereof on either side of the ditch as may be
required to make all necessary repairs and to clean
out the ditch at all reasonable times.
(Emphasis
added). 17 Am. Jur. Section 108, page
1004; Dahlberg v. Lannen, supra, Felsental v.
Warring, 40 Cal. App. 119, 180, page 67. (Emphasis
added).
Laden at page 883.
POINT VI
IT WAS REASONABLE FOR TH0RSENS TO EMPLOY THE USE OF A
BACK HOE TO MAINTAIN THE LOWER "B" DITCH.
The trial court found that at most Thorsen had the right to
14

run a plow across the Gooseberry property or to hand clean the
ditch.
The fact that the easement was originally hand dug does not
preclude the use of modern equipment for the maintenance and
repair but on the contrary, it is contemplated that as a incident
to the easement itself, that modern technology will assist in the
maintenance and repair of ditches and that said equipment would
be so employed.
Beginning in the year 1957, back hoes were implemented as
the primary equipment used for the repair and maintenance of the
"A", M B" , and "C" ditches in the Gooseberry irrigation system.
The United States District Court in United States v. 3.08
Acres of Land, Etc., cited as supra, held:
The preponderance of the evidence, however,
indicates, and I find, that upon the basis of
equipment in existence, the only practical way that
the canal can be cleaned at present, and certainly
the normal and reasonable means under current
conditions, is to utilize a 50 foot boom with drag
line, the banks of the canal at the water line being
some 70 to 90 feet apart, and at being impracticable
because of the construction of the canal and the
necessity of maintaining water in it almost all the
time to move equipment into the bottom.

It must be acknowledged that at the time of the
original reservation, such equipment as a 50 foot
boom and drag line for purposes of cleaning canals
was not a usual thing, and may not have even been in
use at all.
Such an operation was not one that
could be deemed uncontemplated in principle. As a
15

matter of fact, a 100 foot canal probably was not
ordinary construction in those days.
The right reasonably to maintain such a canal,
including the right to operate the 50 foot boom, if
reasonably necessary under existing conditions, must
be considered to be included in the reserved
easement. The general rule is that while an easement
holder may not increase a servitude upon the
grantor's property by enlarging on the easement
itself, it is entitled to do what is reasonably
necessary for full and proper enjoyment of the rights
granted under the easement in the normal development
of the use of the dominant tenement.
(Citations
omitted). (Emphasis added).
United States at 658 to 659.
POINT VII
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SIZE AND CAPACITY OF THE LOWER "B"
DITCH AFTER THE REPAIR AND THE SIZE AND THE CAPACITY
OF THE EASEMENT HISTORICALLY IS AT BEST MINIMAL.
Tim Jones was called as an expert by respondents Gooseberry
Estates.

Gooseberry established his qualifications as having a

Master's

Degree

Engineering

and

in

civil

engineering

specializes

in

from

municipal

Brigham
water,

irrigation, and other water related engineering.

Young
sewer,

(Transcript,

page 187). In response to the specific question from counsel for
Gooseberry Estates as to the capacity of the newly repaired
ditch, he testified:
Answer:
Well, again, if I may, you have flat
sections of it that would be limited and eventually
will silt in and you won't have very much capacity
and then you have the steeper, in the steep sections,
that you could perceive would carry ten second feet
16

of water quite easily and in the flat section where
it silts in - - (Emphasis added).
Question: You could clean those out and still carry
it wouldn't you?
Answer:
thing.

Yes, I mean, that would be a maintenance

Transcript, page 212.
Paul E. Landell, who was also called as an expert at trial,
testified that he walked the length of the excavation on the
lower "B" ditch (Transcript, page 395) and offered testimony at
trial as to the contours of the property and the size of the
ditch after the repair and maintenance took place:
Q: What did you observe concerning the nature of the
back hoe work on the ditch?
A:
Well, one of the things that impressed me is
that it must have been — it's a very difficult area
to work because there is a considerable amount of
cross flow and it was under those circumstances, it
was very difficult to operate a piece of equipment.
A back hoe would be virtually the logical piece of
equipment to use on that, when they started the work.
The upstream of the gate on the north end of the
Johnson property, there were indications of — well,
there was a ditch which had not been excavated and
shortly they got into the excavated area which came
all the way to about the edge of the wooded area,
going in a southerly direction and the ditch itself,
where it ran through there, that I walked through,
was of not a continuous straight gradient, it was
inground, which is rather difficult to work with,
but, as I said, it's got a lot of erratic, a lot of
boulders in it, and it had an average capacity of, I
would say, or an average end area, which would be
useful for carrying water.
And now, this is not
consistent through the whole thing, but I would say
an average of about three feet in width by one and
17

one-half
feet
i n depth*
(Transcript, page 396 - 3 9 7 ) .
Historically,
depth

of

(Emphasis

added).

the d i t c h had a width of t h r e e f e e t or more and a

between

one

foot

and two

and o n e - h a l f

feet.

The

e x c a v a t i o n the respondents claim damaged them was, i n a c t u a l i t y ,
c o n s i s t e n t with the h i s t o r i c a l s i z e of the d i t c h .
POINT VIII
ON REASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES THE COURT MUST RULE IN LIGHT
OF THE ENTIRE RECORD BEFORE IT.
Counsel for Gooseberry argues in their responsive brief that
the Affidavits

of Bruce

D.

Whitehead

and Ken Esplin were

uncontradicted on the Motion for Reassessment of Damages. On the
contrary, the trial court must make its decision based upon the
entire record which includes not only the testimony offered at
trial and the affidavits but the instructions contained in the
opinion from this Court.
Ken

Esplin's

Affidavit

cannot

be

the

sole

basis

for

measuring damages because several contradictory opinions remain
unreconciled in the lower court's holding on reassessment of
damages.

This Court stated on the first appeal:

Esplinfs appraisal was also flawed because it was
based on his assumption that no one had a lawful
irrigation ditch easement through the lots. This was
erroneous.
Thorsen v. Johnson, 745 P 2d 1243, 1246 (Utah 1947) (attached as
Addendum "E" ).
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The Affidavit submitted by Ken Esplin on reassessment of
damages and considered at length in respondent's brief again
fails to address the issue of the size of the existing easement
nor does it consider what effect the historical size of easement
would have on the measure of damages.

The trial court also

neglects to make any findings or address the impact the extent of
the existing

easement would have on determining the damages

awarded by the Court.
All of the record must be considered on reassessment of
damages.
At trial, Ken Esplin testified that there were ten lots
which were damaged, by 50% of their value.

The trial court

accepted the opinion of Ken Esplin at the time of trial with the
exception that the court specifically found nine lots damaged as
opposed to ten.

The Affidavits of Bruce Whitehead and Ken Esplin

do not offer additional information which would warrant expanding
the damage beyond the nine lots previously found by the Court.
To expand the damages outside the nine lots, the Court would have
to use Ken Esplin's Affidavit to impeach Esplin's own testimony
at trial.
Further, at trial, Ken Esplin testified that the diminution
in market value of the ten lots to which he assigned some degree
of damage was a decrease of 50% of their value.
19

In Ken Esplinfs

Affidavit on reassessment of damages, he testifies that the
diminution of value is the difference between $1,250.00 as the
proposed value of the property and that the only other use is for
grazing purposes valued at $100.00 per acre.

No explanation is

ever given or reconciliation made why 50% diminution in value as
previously testified to should now be changed to nearly a 100%
diminution.
The Court's determination that damage existed outside of the
nine lots previously found by the same Court to be damaged is
wholly without foundation in the evidence presented to the Court
by either the Affidavits or otherwise.
CONCLUSION
This Court determined on the first appeal that an easement
existed in favor of Thorsen for a ditch across the Gooseberry
property.

In measuring the damages one must initially make a

determination of the nature and extent of that property right
since Thorsen is liable only for exceeding his property right in
the easement.
The proper determination of the size and extent of the
easement is not the size of the easement after the forces of
nature have obstructed and inhibited the water way, but rather,
the size of the easement should be determined in light of the
purposes for which the easement was originally established.
20

The

record abundantly sets out the size and capacity of the ditch for
the period of 1930 through the time of the cleaning of the ditch
as seven to ten second feet and three feet wide.

Thorsen is

only liable for damages created because he abused or exceeded his
property right.
The damage in this case might be a combination of the amount
of property, if any, taken by the enlarged easement or specific
and the aesthetic effect, if any, the enlarged easement has on
the value of the property.

This Court was correct in directing

the assessment of damages only based on the property actually
taken since the difference between the historical capacity and
size of the ditch and the capacity and size of the repaired ditch
is so small that it does not have much visual impact, if any.
In other words, the issue is not the measure of damages
resulting

from

the

existence

of

the

ditch

itself

on the

Gooseberry property, since that right always existed, but rather,
the

appropriate

measure

is

for only

that

portion

of

the

excavation which exceeded Thorsen's lawful property interest.
As one reviews the testimony and evidence presented, it is
evident that Thorsen did not greatly exceed his right to repair
and maintain

the

lower

"B" ditch

and therefore, appellant

respectfully requests this Court to reverse the decision of the
trial court and direct the award of minimal damages, if any, to
21

respondent.
DATED this 26th day of May,/ 1989.

FREDERICK A.\ 0IACKMAN
Attorney for Appellant
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CHESTER A. NIXON et a!., Appts.,
v.
VKIiNA li. W K U J I v.i ttl

Iowa Supreme Court — October 15, 1946
( _ Iowa —, 169 ALR 1141, 24 NW2d 476)
Easements, § 54 — repair — artificial drainage ditch.
1. The owner of the servient estate over whose land an easement exists
in a watercourse, in favor of the owner of the dominant estate, must permit
cleaning out of the watercourse across his land.
[See annotation on this question beginning on page 1117.]
Easements, § 54 — repair — artificial drainage ditch — duty of dominant
owner — cost.
2. The owner of an easement in an artificial drainage ditch across land
of another for the discharge of surface waters from his dominant land, if
the only party benefited thereby, has the duty of keeping the easement in
repair and must bear the entire cost of cleaning out and reopening the
ditch when it becomes filled in by natural causes.
[See annotation on this question beginning on page 1147.]
Waters, §§60, 61 — surface waters
— drainage of — establishment
of drainage district.
3. An owner of land within an established drainage district who can
show that a part of his land is not
in fact drained by the established
ditch, but constitutes a dominant
tract drained by another natural or
lMMir-PQl«h!io|ipil iirlififijil wMl«»rrniirgo
ai'it'oa

o«ivlcnl

laml

«>f

UIM»III«I,

la

entitled to all the rights of a dominant holder as against the servient
holder, the same as if his land was
not within the drainage district.
fSee Am Jur "Drains and Sewers,"
§ 61.]
Waters, § 74 — prescriptive rights —
drainage of surface waters.
4. The existence in favor of a landowner of an easement for drainage of
surface waters across lands of another
through an artificial ditch used for
that purpose for many years, and his
right to have the ditch cleaned out
and restored, do not depend upon
the legal establishment of the drainage ditch but may rest upon prescription.
[See Am Jur "Easements," § 85.]
Waters, § 74 — drainage of surface
waters — prescriptive right.
5. An easement for the flow of surface waters across the lands of an-

other exists by prescription where it
appears that an artificial drainage
ditch across the servient land had
been openly used for more than forty
years, under claim of right, to convey
surface waters from the dominant
estate across the servient estate to
an outlet to a lake.
fSee Am Jur "Easements/1 S «5.1
Wttlelci,

9

1)0 —

aUlfrttc

*uli'i»

drainage — blocking of.
6. An easement existing in favor of
a dominant estate for the flow of surface waters across a road and thence
across lands of another may not bo
blocked up either by the highway authorities or by the owner of the
servient land.
Highways, § 13 — defects in highways
— blocking surface drainage —
construction of culvert — cost of.
7. When county highway authorities, in grading a highway, remove
a culvert through which surface waters from abutting land drained into
an artificial watercourse across servient land on the opposite side of the
highway, the cost of restoring the
culvert to permit free flowage of surface waters from the dominant lands
into the drainage ditch must be
borne by the county.
[See Am Jur "Easement?," 8 108. |
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APPEAL by plaintiff from an adverse decree of the District Court, Harrison County, in an action for a mandatory injunction to require defendant
Board of Supervisors to restore a culvert, and defendant landowners to
permit a drainage ditch to be cleaned out and maintained, as an outlet for
discharge of surface waters from plaintiff's land. Decree reversed and
cause rcmandtd.
Roy E. Havens, of Logan, and De
Vere Watson, of Council Bluffs, for
appellants:
Where a drainage ditch has been
onn*tnn*teil with th* kno\vlr<^p ;uicl
t ••iinenl

*.f

I lie*.

u i \ Mel

«»f

ilir

luml

through which it runs and has been
maintained for more than ten years
without objection on the part of the
original owner or his grantees an
easement and enforceable right therein is acquired. Ehler v. Stier, 205
Iowa 673, 216 NW 637; Hatton v.
Cale, 152 Iowa 485, 132 NW 1101;
Pascal v. Hynes, 170 Iowa 121, 152
NW 26; Schwartz v. Wapello County,
208 Iowa 1229, 227 NW 91; Jacobson
v. Camden, — Towa —, 20 NW2d 407.
The statutes of Iowa impose a duty
upon officers having charge of highways to maintain openings therein to
permit surface water to escape in its
natural and established course to
servient lands, and performance of
that duty may be compelled by the
courts. Pate v. Rogers, 193 Iowa 726,
187 NW 451; Jacobson v. Camden, —
Iowa —, 20 NW2d 470.
As to whether or not they will perform such mandatory ministerial duty
they have no legal discretion. 34 Am
Jur, Mandamus, p 859, § 70; p 862,
S 72; p 969, § 197; Pierce v. Green,
229 Iowa 22, 294 NW 237, 131 ALR
335; Bredt v. Franklin County, 227
Iowa 1230, 290 NW 669.
Welch & Welch and William P.
Welch, all of I^fran, for Verna R.
Wt-lrli mid Willi .in I\ W«•!• h.
Wright & Kbtle. of Council Bluffs,
for trustees of the estate of G. M.
Dodge, deceased.
Harold E. Hanson, of Logan, for
William Waiters, K L. Brundige, and
J. C. Hammitt, County Supervisors of
Harrison County, Iowa.
Mulroney, J.
Sections 23 and 24 in Cincinnati
Township in Harrison County are
separated by a north and south county road. Plaintiffs, Nixon and Bierring, own land along the east side of
the road in section 24 and the defendant, Verna Welch, owns land

along the west side of the road in
section 23. Plaintiffs sued Verna
Welch and her husband and the
board of supervisors alleging that
(ho

qtirfstrn

Will or

»lr.iiniu|

aouth

across the west part ol the Nixon
land onto the Bierring land and
thence, until the year 1940, westerly
through a culvert under the road
onto the Welch land and through an
open ditch extending in a southwesterly direction across the Welch land
to a lake along the west side of the
Welch land. The petition alleged
that in 1940 the board had caused
the road to be graded and the culvert
removed and that the ditch across
the Welch land had become filled
with soil; that the culvert and the
ditch across the Welch land were all
a part of an established drainage
system known as the Bowman ditch
established in 1878 by the joint action of the owners of the land in
sections 23 and 24 and the owners
of other lands lying to the north of
Nixon's land. The petition claimed
an easement in favor of plaintiffs
for the flow of surface water across
the highway and across the Welch
land, and the right to have the culvert restored and the ditch across
the Welch land cleaned out and
maintained as an outlet. The petition nllrjjvd Hnmiif/r i by rranon of
the damming up of the surface water and the prayer was for a mandatory injunction to compel the
board to restore the culvert and to
require the defendant Verna Welch
to permit the ditch across her land
to be cleaned out and maintained as
an outlet for the surface water flowing from plaintiffs' land and for
general equitable relief.
The portions of Verna Welch's answer that are responsive to the
claims of plaintiffs deny that the
Bowman ditch was ever "constructed under proceedings of the Board of
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Supervisors of Harrison County"
and assert the records merely show
a proposal for a ditch that was abandoned and never maintained; that
there never has been any drainage,
natural or artificial of the surface
water from plaintiffs* land across
the road and across the Welch land
and that plaintiffs' land is in fact
lower than the Welch land. The
board of supervisors adopted the

in a southwesterly direction and
that the Welch land was slightly
lower than the plaintiffs' land. The
record with respect to the Bowman
ditch shows proceedings commencing in 1877 when the respective owners of the land petitioned the board
for its establishment; the letting of
the contract, and the assessments to
pay for its construction. One witness, William Sproul, who had been

yilh'irrd

filmili. # ir w i t h lh\< l;iii<) *iiir«- | . * T ;

l l l i ' l r |H I'tk't'i-rsMtU ":i in «iltii'i* i i i l viM«*d

l i ^ l i l n il Dull lii* lul|i«-il c l t i i t i nut (In

a sound discretion in not constructing the culvert. The defendants,
trustees of the Estate of G. M.
Dodge, are the holders of a mortgage on the Welch land and their
counsel stated in open court they
would abide by any decree without
pleading.
The trial court heard much evidence of witnesses who had been
familiar with this land for many
years. Some of them had known the
land for more than half a century,
some for forty years and others for
somewhat lesser periods of time. It
was all to the effect that a swale
extended from the northern boundary of Nixon's land in a southwestern direction to the old culvert site
near the southwestern corner of the
Bierring land and thence across the
Welch land to the lake; that this
swale was the watercourse that
drained the Nixon and Bierring
land, though it perhaps did operate
with decreasing efficiency as the
years went on and the ditch gradually filled in. The records with

Bowman ditch in 1903 or 1904 and
he stated: "The Township Trustees
paid us for that cleanout job in
1903 and 1904. At that time the
trustees had authority to levy their
own taxes, funds and their own
drainage funds. They haven't that
authority now."
It was undisputed that the culvert
was destroyed when the road was
graded in 1940. But the record
shows that it would be of little advantage to plaintiffs to merely restore the culvert now for the ditch
across the Welch land has partially
filled in. During late years part of
the ditch on the Welch land was so
shallow that the land was cultivated
across the ditch.
I. The defendants introduced the
records with respect to another
drainage ditch called the Wilson
ditch which runs in a north and
south direction through the sections
lying immediately east of section 24.
These records show that all of plaintiffs' land lies in this Wilson drainage district. Upon this last documentary «»vidnir«- with r«*i|M«l l«»

Wolch n n s w i T ;»n«I f u r t h e r

rcM|»i'ft

t o th«* old lti»\vni:in

ilitrli

wore introduced ami this *\%ak* followed the course of that ditch. The
testimony of the witnesses was well
supported by photographs showing
the line of the depression, and by the
county engineer. There was some
testimony that at the time of trial
some of the water pockets on the
Nixon land would, in times of heavy
rainfall, drain north into a road
ditch along paved highway 30 which
runs along the north side of the
Nixon land, but the evidence did
establish that the natural drainage
of the west part of section 24 was

the Wilson drainage district, Uu-

trial court based his decision that
he was without jurisdiction to compel the opening of the culvert or the
ditch across the Welch land. The
trial court in his decree stated:
". . . to grant the prayer of plaintiffs' petition would be an attempt
to usurp the power and authority
of the Board of Supervisors given to
it by statute to determine the course
of drainage within the said Wilson
Drainage District." But there was
some evidence that there was high
ground on the plaintiffs' land bv-
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tween the western part of plaintiffs*
land and the Wilson ditch. It is
somewhat significant that the east
and west lateral to the Wilson ditch
across section 24, as originally proposed, was to start at the west side
of section 24 and on the center line
of the section. This was changed,
upon the engineers' recommendation
so that the lateral as finally constructed starts with the center of
the section. As stated there was
abundant evidence that the land in
the west portion of section 24
drained south and west. The plaintiffs on this appeal, in many divisions in their brief, argue that the
evidence firmly establishes that the
drainage of the west part of their
land was south and west over the
course of the old Bowman ditch,
through the culvert across the road,
:iinl

t In «»ii|rlt

lh«* i l i t t ' l i

urnwin t l u -

Uclch land. We have not detailed
all of the evidence, for the defendants in their brief did not reply to
the foregoing divisions in plaintiffs9
brief but rely entirely on the proposition stated by the trial court,
namely: That since plaintiffs9 land
was within the Wilson drainage district then this "conclusively shows
the drainage is to the east." Defendants state in their brief that
they pleaded as a defense to plaintiffs' petition that the plaintiffs9 land
was within the Wilson Drainage District. No such defense was in fact
pleaded. We are not directed to any
authorities holding that the establishment of a drainage district deprives the landowners therein of the
rights to the free flowage of surface
water as between dominant and
servient holders of land within the
district when the established ditch
does not in fact drain off such surface water into the ditch. We hold
that the mere fact that the land is
within an established drainage district is not enough to preclude the
owner of the land from asserting
rights with respect to surface water
that he would have if the land was
not included in the district. If he

169 ALR

can show that part of his land was
not in fact drained by
Headnou 3 the established ditch
but was in fact a dominant tract and drained by another
natural or long established artificial
watercourse across the servient land
he is entitled to all the rights of the
dominant holder as against the servient holder, the same as if the land
was not within the drainage district.
We think the evidence here clearly
shows that the west part of plaintiffs' land was not drained by the
Wilson ditch; that the drainage was
to the south and west in the swale
still partially existing from the old
Bowman ditch that extends across
the Welch land.
II. Defendants argue that the
Bowman ditch was not legally established. Of course they moan the
:tiu i<-ut rfi-onlM n o w availal»K- ilo nut

show that every step required by law
with respect to its establishment9
was complied with. But plaintiffs
rights do not depend upon the legal
establishment of the Bowman ditch.
The fact remains that there was
such a ditch once dug and it remained a watercourse
for the drainage of plaintiffs9 land until partially
destroyed by the filling, up of that
portion of the watercourse that was
on the Welch land and completely
destroyed by the destruction of the
culvert by the board of supervisors
when the road was graded in 1940.
Plaintiffs9 rights to the
Headnote 4 relief demanded depend
upon whether they have
acquired an easement in the watercourse and even if the Bowman ditch
was not legally established it can
still be an artificial watercourse upon which easement rights can be
based if acquired by prescription.
The rule is stated in 67 CJ 901 and
902, section 330:
"An artificial channel, as well as
a natural channel, may be a watercourse . . . By what is said to be
the weight of authority, that which
was at first an artificial channel will
become a natural watercourse when
for all of the years of the prescriptive period it has taken the place,
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and served principally in lieu, of a
natural channel. Likewise, where
neighborhood drainage ditches have
been opened by common consent and
used for a series of years, they become watercourse as fully as if they
were not of artificial origin, and
especially after the period of prescription has run."
III. The record here shows that
the easement existed in favor of the
dominant estate for the flow of surface water across the road and
across the Welch land. It existed
either by virtue of the concert of
action by the ancient owners of all
this land through which the Bowman ditch was constructed or it
existed by prescription in that it
was shown to be a waterHeadnou 6 course openly used under
a claim of riirht to con
v « \ v tl»«* • • u r f n r i * W i i t i - i f i o i u t I n - « t i u i i i

nant estate across the servient estate to the lake outlet. See Ehler v.
Stier, 205 Iowa 678, 216 NW 637:
Hatton v. Cale, 152 Iowa 485, 132
NW 1101; Neuhring v. Schmidt, 130
Iowa 401, 106 NW 630; Vannest v.
Fleming, 79 Iowa 638, 44 NW 906,
8 LRA 277, 18 Am St Rep 387.
Our holding that the easement
existed means of course that the defendant board and the
He*4note c defendant Welch could
not block up the watercourse. With respect to the board
of supervisors, see Jacobson v. Camden, Iowa, 20 NW2d 407, 408, and
cases there cited. In this case Justice Garfield, speaking for the court,
stated:
"It is the duty of highway authorities to place openings in highway grades so as to permit surface
water to escape in its natural course
from the higher to the lower lands."
IV. But there is no evidence that
the ditch on the Welch land was
stopped up by action of the landowner. While there is some evidence that the Welch land was cultivated over part of the ditch in recent years, the plaintiffs concede that
the stoppage in the Welch ditch was
from natural causes due to its filling
up with dirt. The engineer testi-

fied that the bottom of the Welch
ditch would have to be lowered approximately 3 feet in order adequately to drain off the surface
water from plaintiffs' land.
It is the law that the owner of the
servient estate, over whose land an
easement exists in a waHeadnote i tercourse. in favor of
the owner of the dominant estate, must permit the cleaning
out of the watercourse across his
land. See, Wessels v. Colebank, 174
111 618, 51 NE 639; Bowman v.
Bradley, 127 Or 45, 270 P 919; Dahlberg v. Lannen, 84 Mont 68, 274 V
151; Lamb v. Lamb, 177 NC 150.
98 SE 307; Holm v. Davis, 41 Utah
200, 125 P 403, 44 LRA NS 89;
Pvott v. State. 170 Ind 118, 83 NE
737; 67 CJ 907.
Ill W V ^ r l : V Pi»li*l»sml..
:ll|»l:i
I I V 1 HI 1>KH, o l M L t i 4 1 J , llu- o p i n ion states:
M

The right to keep in repair a
way is fully established. The cases
on the subject of obstruction erected
in or to watercourses or drains are
quite numerous, but there seem to
be few authorities in regard to the
right of entering upon the land of
the owner of the servient heritage,
and removing obstructions occurring through natural causes in an
artificial channel. In Chapman v.
[Thames] Manufacturing Co. 13
Conn 269 [33 Am Dec 401], it was
held that obstructions in an artificial channel, through which there
exists the prescriptive right to flow
the waters of a lake, though occasioned by natural causes, may be
removed by the persons whose lands
are overflowed, without there being
any right on the part of the owner
of the channel to object. In Roberts
v. Roberts, 55 NY 275, the former
owner of a tract of land had drained
the upper part of it, by means of
a ditch, into the lower part, and
afterwards conveyed the tract in
two parts to different persons. In
an action by the owner of the upper
tract against the owner of the lower
tract the court said: 4If the ditch
got out of repair by reason of floods
or washing away its banks, or oth-
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erwise, it was the legal right of the
plaintiff to repair it, so as to restore
it to its original condition, and make
it subserve the purpose which it

sonable and convenient use of the
easement, doing no unnecessary injury to the servient estate/ A large
number of cases in support of the

»>i i n i t i a l l y

iliH'Irhit* nri* f o l h i t r i i

HlVi'lc'il, n f
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the water of the stream. He was entitled to have the ditch kept up as
it was when he purchased, and to
keep it in that condition, and, if
necessary, to enter upon the defendant's lands to make repairs, doing
no unnecessary injury.' In Liford's
Case, 11 Coke, 46b, it is said: The
law giveth power to him who ought
to repair a bridge to enter into the
land, and to him who hath a conduit within the land of another to
enter the land and mend it, when
cause requireth, as it was resolved
in 9 Edw IV pi 35/ where it was
held that the right to scour and
amend a trench was incident to a
grant of a right to dig it in another's
land for the purpose of drawing
water through the same; and the
same doctrine is sustained in Peter
v. Daniel, 5 CB 568. Washb Easem,
c 6, § 1, pi 4. It would seem, therefore, that the common law annexes
to the easement of a drain in another's land the right to go upon such
land, and clean out or repair such
drain without doing unnecessary
injury to the land/'
In Dahlbcrg v. Lunuen, supra [SI
Mont 68, 274 P 154], it is stated:
"It is well settled that a person
having an easement in a ditch
through the land of another may go
upon the servient land and make all
necessary repairs and clean the
ditch. 9 RCLP 795; Holm v. Davis.
41 Utah 200, 125 P 403, 44 LRA NS
89; Carson v. Gentner, 33 Or 512,
52 P 506, 43 LRA }30/'
In Holm v. Davis, supra, there is
a quotation from Jones on Easements. The opinion states [41 Utah
200, 125 P 407] :
"The right of the owner of an
easement is admirably stated by Mr.
Jones in his excellent work on Easements, § 814, in the following words:
T h e owner of a dominant estate
having an easement has a right to
enter upon the servient estate, and
make repairs necessary for the rea-

by DM* t n i l l i m *

in a footnote to the section aforesaid to which we refer the reader.
The doctrine is also well illustrated
and applied to an irrigating ditch
by the Supreme Court of California
in Joseph v. Ager, 108 Cal 517, 41
P 422/'
The rule and illustration is thus
stated in 17 Am Jur 1004:
"The dominant owner has the
right of access to make repairs and
may enter upon the servient estate
for this purpose. He may not, however, inflict any necessary injury.
To illustrate: A person having an
easement in a ditch running through
the land of another may go upon
the servient land and use so much
thereof on either side of the ditch
as may be required to make all necessary repairs and to clean out the
ditch at all reasonable times; he is
liable only for the abuse of this
right. It has also been held that
the right of access is not limited
to purposes of repairing, but may
be exercised to make original constructions necessary for the enjoyment of the easement/'
The case of Mutton v. Cnle, 132

Iowa 485, 132 N\V 1101, is much
in point. There the defendant, a
servient owner, sought, in a crossbill, an injunction forbidding plaintiff, the dominant owner, from
cleaning out a ditch across the defendant's land which had been established many years ago. The
court held the plaintiff had an easement and denied the injunction forbidding him from cleaning out the
ditch.
We held in Bina v. Bina, 213 Iowa
432, 239 XW 68, 78 ALR 1216. that
the owner of a road easement across
the land of another was entitled to
repair the road to render it a suitable passage way. As stated in
Bowman v. Bradley, supra [127 Or
45, 270 P 922], the easement for the
flowage of water "differs from no
other easement across the land of
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another/* It is our holding that
plaintiffs are entitled to the relief
demanded; that they are entitled
to have the culvert restored and the
ditch across th«» Welch Inml rimmed
out.
V. As to the costs for constructing the culvert, it is clear that this
should be borne by the
He*di»ie i county. The culvert was
destroyed by the county
in breach of its duty to place an
opening to permit the free flowage
of surface water, Jacobson v. Camden, supra.
VI. There is no showing by the
plaintiff that the open ditch would
benefit the Welch land. In plaintiffs' original petition there was no
prayer that the owner of the Welch
land clean out the ditch and no
prayer that the cleaning out of the
ditch be done at the expense of
Verna Welch. The prayer was merely for a mandatory injunction requiring Verna R. Welch to permit
the cleaning out of the ditch. In
a subsequent reply plaintiffs alleged
their willingness to pay their "proportionate share of the expense of
such clean out." There is no evidence upon which we could make
any fair apportionment. Ordinarily
the owner of an easement across the

land of another has the duty to repair the easement when he is the
only party benefited by the easement
It i •. o u r liolilitit? Ilt.it

tin- . n t i K

cost of the cleaning out of the ditch
on the Welch land be
HeadiMU t borne by plaintiffs. We
do not mean to imply
that we would in an injunction action like this ever apportion costs
in view of our statutes for the establishment of drainage districts
and subdrainage districts whore
costs can be better apportioned.
Plaintiffs sought a mandatory injunction to permit the cleaning out
of the ditch on the Welch land.
That injunction we give them but
at their expense and subject to the
rule that they commit no unnecessary damage. The culvert will be
restored at the expense of th<county. The decree of the trial
court is reversed and the cause remanded for decree in conformity
with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
All Justices concur, except Hays,
J., who takes no part.
Petition for rehearing
January 17, 1947.

denied

ANNOTATION
Rights and duties of owners inter se with respect to upkeep and repair
of water easement
[Easements, § 54]
I. Introduction, 1147.
II. Rights and duties of dominant owners, in general:
a. Rights, 1148.
b. Duties, 1151.
III. Rights and duties of servient owners, in general, 1152.
IV. Rights and duties under projects beneficial to both owners, in general,
1153.
V. Rights and duties under particular grants or contracts, 1154.
its enjoyment is not bound to keep
I. Introduction
As a general rule, in the absence of such means in repair or to sustain any
an agreement, the owner of land sub- expense in maintaining them in a
ject to an easement of a nature which proper condition. The duty and pn\irequires the maintenance of means for lege of constructing an easement or
+ Consult ALR BLUE BOOK for cases s u k ^ a e n t to publication date •
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ln*# that be knew the power line and the E. 970, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 996, 124 Am. S t
i J T i t crossed his land; that the market Rep. 528. At any rate, it is not such an er• * # 0 f the defendant's farm, tef ore the ror, if there be one, as requires a reversal
^ _ _ ctlon of the power line was not to of the judgment.
We are of the opinion that no reversible
2 w t i f $10,000; that the market value of the
y j ^ . gtrip without the poles upon it was error is shown, and that the judgment of the
S > and with the poles $40; and that the court below ought therefore to be affirmed,
Z a n c e of the farm.was not injured nor the with costs. It is so ordered.
fjtrittt Talue of it depreciated by reason of
FRICK, C. J-, and McCARTY, J.f concur.
4 * construction and maintenance of the
gfirrr line. Then, in response to further
l o t i o n s propounded to him on his direct
HOLM v. DAVIS et a l
fgtintnntion, he further stated that he was
(Supreme Court of Utah. June 12, 1912.)
fifju:'.Intcd with sales of lands similar in
character to the defendant's land, and that 1. TRIAL (§ 400*) — FINDINGS—AMENDMENT.
Comp. Laws 1907, $ 3005, confers jurisdicIt bad knowledge of the sale of a particuon the court under certain circumstances
lar tract near the defendant's land, and that tion
to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or
te obtained such information from the agent other proceeding taken against him through his
«f the parties who had purchased the tract mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
Xlnreupon the court, on its own motion, ob- neglect on such terms with reference to costs as
may be proper, etc., and section 3168 progrrved: "You are seeking to prove particular vides that, on the trial of a question of fact
m\t+, are you? Counsel for Plaintiff: Yes, by the court, its decision must be given in
*r." The court stated: "That is not admis- writing and filed with the clerk within 30 days
the cause is submitted for decision, but
dft'.e under the rule on direct examination" after
that the court at any time before notice of ap«4tid observed that such things may be in- peal is served or filed, or before motion for
qelrrd about on cross-examination, and then a new trial is ruled on, may add to or modify
findings in any respect so as to make the
m redirect, but not on the direct examina- the
same conform to the issues presented by the
tion. "Counsel: Do I understand the court pleadings and to the evidence adduced at the
t§ rule, then, that the witness on direct ex- trial, but that no such additions to or modifiamination cannot give his statement of par- cations of the findings shall be made, unless
notice in writing, specifying generally the additicular values of similar property? Court: tions or modifications desired, shall have been
t t t : that is the uniform practice." This served on the adverse party or his attorney.
fttling is complained of. As stated in 1 El- Held that, independent of such sections, the
court, after the expiration of the term at which
•att, Ev. f 180, Jones, Ev. (2d Ed.) { 168, an
action was tried and determined, notwithtftd 13 Ency. Ev. pp. 457-463, there is a standing the pendency of a motion to retax
Barked conflict of opinion as to the compe- costs, had no jurisdiction to modify the findtecy of evidence on direct examination to ings on its own motion.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Trial, Cent.
ifcow the sale price of other lands of general
Mailarity in location, character, and adapta- Dig. i§ 949, 950; D e c Dig. $ 400.*J
titty to use of the lands sold with those the 2. LICENSES (§ 44*)—USE OF REAL PROPERTY
—EASEMENT DISTINGUISHED.
taloe of which is in question, and of sales
Where intervener constructed and used a
totde about the time the value of the latter canal over plaintiff's land for a millrace and ir•Kitt be established. The cases supporting rigation ditch to furnish water for motive power for the mill, and to irrigate certain lands,
• * affirmative and those the negative of the and
such canal, though originally constructed
It^'osition are there noted. Even though by consent of plaintiff's grantor, had been used
* * conclusion' should be reached that such and maintained for such purposes for more
than twenty years when plaintiff purchased the
* i « may properly be shown on the direct same,
intervener's right to maintain, protect,
•Uinluation, yet we are clearly of the opin- and improve it was not a mere license, but an
*•* that in this instance the plaintiff was easement acquired by prescription.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Licenses,
• * harmed by the ruling. The wimess had
•J**tdy stated that he had bought and sold Cent. Dig. §§ 97-99; Dec Dig. § 44.*]
•tods; that he knew of sales of lands simi- 3. WATERS AND WATEB COURSES ($ 154*)—
WATER CANAL*—MAINTENANCE.
** to that of the defendant; that he knew
Where intervener had acquired a prescrip*** market value of such lands and the tive easement to maintain a water canal over
••**et value of the defendant's land, and plaintiff's land, intervener was entitled to enter
••ted what that was, and the amoT^it which on the land to clean out and make necessary
repairs to the canal, doing no unnecessary in• bis opinion the value of the defendant's jury to the servient estate.
J ^ was depreciated by reason of the con[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Waters and
junction of the power line over it. In such Water Courses, Cent. Dig. §§ 167-179; Dec.
*•* the plaintiff was not prejudiced even Dig. § 154.»]
, 0Q
" &h it be assumed that it, on u e direct 4. MASTER A^D SERVANT (§ 302*)—INJURIES
TO THIRD PERSONS—TEESPASS BY SERVANTS.
^njination of the witness, was entitled to
Where defendant, having an easement to
*ow Bales of other lands. Seattle k M. Ry. maintain
a water canal over plainrif"s land,
T
^
- Gilchrist, 4 Wash. 509, 30 Pac. 739; sent workmen to clean ou: and repair :he canal,
a finding that they trespassed on gr-und not
I**1* v. Boston, 1G5 Mass. 88, 42 >\ E. 506;
| necessary for their work wns inen«~:—* ^~

*v*
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so trespassing the workmen acted beyond the
scope of their employment, rendering themselves, and not intervener, liable for their acts.
[Ed. Note.—For otter cases, see Master and
Servant, Cent. Dig. f| 1217-1221, 1225, 1229;
Dec. Dig. i 302.*]
Appeal from District Court, Utah County;
J. E. Booth, Judge.
Action by Annes Holm against Warren E.
Davis, in which the Spanish Fork Co-operative Institution intervened. Judgment for
plaintiff, and intervener appeals. Reversed
and remanded.
A. Saxey, of Spanish Fork, for appellant.
Elias Hanson, of Sjanish Fork, for respondent.

over his land. The issues were tried t*j
court without a jury. The court, after i _
ing a personal inspection of the canal j
ditch, on the 27th day of May, 1911,
the following findings of fact and •<
sions of law; "That the plaintiff is the <
er of the land described in his complj
that the defendant, the Spanish Fork
operative Institution, a corporation,.&n]
millrace, which race is also used as a*]
rigation canal, running through the
land on a sidehill, and has maintained
canal for more than 20 years, and
was built with the consent of the then
er of the land; that it is necessary
year to year that the said canal should'
cleared out and repaired; that the defi
FRICK, C. J. The respondent commenced ant Warren E. Davis, in May, 1910, at
this action against the defendant 'Davis to employe of the said defendant corpora
recover damages for trespasses that it is al- with the assistance of other men, cle
leged said Davis by himself and "by his out and repaired the said ditch; that
agents" had committed on respondent's land,
which is specifically described in the com- performing the work necessary thereto
plaint. Davis answered, justifying the al- unnecessary damage or injury was done
leged trespasses. His answer is, however, the ground of the plaintiff, but the work
not material to the real questions involved trespassed on ground not necessary for <
here, and therefore will not be referred to work; that neither of said defendants
hereafter. The apx^llant asked and was ther made or attempted to make any.
given leave to intervene in the action com- rangements with the plaintiff whereby
menced against Davis as aforesaid, and in might go onto plaintiff's ground :fo*
its complaint in intervention it in substance performance of said work; that the
alleged that the fee to the land in question tiff has sustained only nominal dan
was in the respondent; that it was the own- Judgment should therefore be for the
er, and for many years prior to the com- tiff that he recover damages in the sun]
mencement of the action had been the own- $1, and that the defendant, the
er, of a flouring mill which it operated by Fork Co-operative Institution, a corpoi^t
water power, which water was obtained from pay the said sum of $1, and the. cogbN
Spanish Fork river by means of a canal or this suit." The appeal is upon the jud
ditch about three miles in length; that said roll without a bill of exceptions contti
canal or ditch passed through respondent's the evidence. All that we can deter
land, and that the same was constructed, therefore, is whether the pleadings and i
owned, occupied, and used by appellant for ings of fact sustain the conclusions of lil
the purposes of conducting water through and judgment.
[1] It is not necessary to refer to the p*
the same to said mill for a period of 25
years without molestation or interference ings further than has been done. As
from any one, and for about 23 years before have seen, the findings constituting the
the respondent purchased and became the cision of the court were filed on the
owner of the land in question; that the ap- day of May, 1911, during the April ternpellant claims the rizht to use, maintain, court. Thereafter, to wit, on the 26th
and repair said canal as an easement over of August, 1911, after the April term
said land, and that :he acts complained of court had been adjourned without date,
by respondent were committed by appellants pending the July term, the court modified
agents and employes by going on and along findings of fact by inserting that portio*|
said canal or ditch fcr the purpose of mak- thereof which we have italicized. Appd4
ing repairs that were necessary and requir- lant at the time obje:ted to the court's t*"|
ed, and for that purpose removed sand and thority to make the modification in the to*|
gravel that had accumulated in said canal, ings, and now insists that the court exceedy
and which had to te removed to permit ed its power or jurisdiction in making
the necessary water to flow through the modification of the findings as indica
same to said mill; tint said sand and grav- and that, therefore, for the purposes of
el were carefully removed and deposited decision, said modification must be d<
along the margin of tie bank of said canal, as not having been made. Did the court «*
and that no unnecessary thing was done or ceed its power in making the modiflcat*°^j
act committed in doinr said work. Respond- complained of by appellant? It is prad
ent answered the complaint, admitting the ly conceded by respondent, at least it is *<*|
allegations therein, except that appellant controverted by him. that the findings
J
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modification thereof was made in the fol-< Treating the findings, therefore, as origv!!ring July t e n n - W e 6 h a 1 1 a s s u m e t faat tofrlly m a ^e and filed by the court, do they
<jer the decisions of this court the district (sustain the conclusions of law and judgment
^ort had the power to modify its findings entered against appellant for the sum of $1
*# anv time before the adjournment of the damages and for costs? Counsel for appeltenn during which they were made and fil- laflt insists that, in view that the court
* and that said modification could also found that the canal or ditch in question had
bo made if made in accordance with the pro- been constructed over appellant's land for
visions of Comp. Laws 1907, I 3168, or un- more than a sufficient length of time to conder the provisions of section 3005. In the stitute said canal or 'ditch an easement on
case at bar, the findings were, however, or over his land, therefore appellant had a
modified after the term, and no attempt legal right to enter upon and along said ca*•*«* made to conform to the provisions of nal or ditch to repair and clean out the same
either one of the foregoing sections. The if the work was done without unnecessary
question, therefore, is, Did the court of its injury to respondent's land or property, and
oun motion have the power to make a modi- therefore appellant was not guilty of tresfication of its findings at the time and in pass, and, if this be so, the conclusion of law
the manner disclosed by this record? Re- and judgment for damages and costs are not
indent's counsel seeks to justify the ac- enstained by said findings, and cannot pretion of the court on the ground that appel- vail. Counsel for respondent contends that,
lant had filed a motion to retax costs during because the court found that the canal was
the April term which remained pending and originally constructed "with the consent of
was finally disposed of by the court on the the then owner of the land" in question here,
26th day of August and at the time the the canal was constructed and maintained
modification was made, all of which was under a license from the owner of the land,
during the July term. The motion to retax | and that, where such is the case, no easecosts was based upon the findings as they ment is acquired. aBd therefore none exists
then stood, and vmdei which appellant's in this case* The foregoing contentions precounsel contended his client could not be sent the real question in the case.
[2] We have no means of determining
required to pay costs under our statute. The
court seemed to appreciate the force of what the evidence was, and the court's findcounsel's contention in that regard, and thus ings are far from specific. In view, howevmodified the findings so that the costs could er, that both parties have expressed an earlegally be taxed against appellant. The mo- nest desire that we should, if possible untion to retax costs certainly was not made der the findings as they are, determine
nor intended for the purpose of having the whether the canal in question constitutes an
court modify its findings under the provi- easement or not, we have concluded that in
sions of section 3168 or under section 3005, view of the permanent character of the casupra. Indeed, the motion was filed and in- nal and the purposes for and time during
tended for an entirely different purpose. which it was constructed, maintained, and
The motion therefore was not and in the used, the findings are sufficient to enable us
nature of things could not have invoked the to determine that question, although the findpower of the court to modify its findings ings are somewhat meager in detail. The
within the purview of the two sections re- findings show that the canal was constructferred to. Nor, in view that the term of ed and used for a millrace and irrigating
court at which the findings were made and ditch to furnish water for motive power for
filed had been finally adjourned, did the a mill, and to irrigate lands to make the
<t»urt possess inherent power to make the same productive; that the canal had been
modification complained of. That the court constructed, maintained, and used for the
cannot legally mafce modification of its find- pxuposes aforesaid lox more than 20 years
ing after the term has expired when such when respondent purchased and became the
nullification is not made under and in con- owner of the land over which the canal was
formity with the provisions of either one coLstructed and maintained. If the canal
or the other of sections 3168 or 3005, supra, during the 20 years was maintained and
so a* to extend the time within which to us*d adversely and under a claim of right,
tal- an appeal was held by us in the case such use for that length of time would have
of Atwood v. 'Davis at the October, 1911, ril-rned into a prescriptive right constituttern of this court. The question having ing an easement. This has been the uniform
***-£ determined on a motion to dismiss the holding of this court. See Lund v. Wilcox,
a
P>al, no opinion was filed, but the ap- 34 Utah, 205, 97 Pac. 33, and cases there cit**&'- dismissed. We are of the opinion, ed. Counsel for respondent in effect concede
therefore, that the court in making the the law in this state to be so, but he contoO'Ilfication of the findings as aforesaid on tends that, because the court found that the
iK
wn motion after the term had expired canU was originally constructed with the
**c—ded its power, and that the findings con-ent of the owner of the land, the claim
U|
us:. for the purjoses of this decision, be of * dverse user uLder claim of right has no
treated as though no such nmHifinoHAn

does not necessarily follow that because a
ditch or any other permanent structure is
constructed on or over the lands of another
with such other's consent the use and maintenance thereof by the person who constructed it or his assignee cannot be adverse and
under a claim of right within the purview
of the law governing easements acquired by
prescription. The question to a large extent
depends upon the character of the use or
thing which is claimed as an easement, and
the object or purpose for which the thing was
constructed, used, and maintained. In this
case the canal or ditch was constructed for
a purpose which was permanent in its nature. We may well assume that no one
would build a mill and construct a canal
three or more miles in length for the purpose
of providing water for motive power to operate the mill and irrigate the arid lands, except as a permanent thing. That such is the
case is natural, and must be obvious to all,
and hence needs no argument or elaboration.
The fact, therefore, that the canal was on
the land and was being used for the purposes aforesaid was notice to the respondent
that it was a structure of a permanent character used for purposes permanent in their
nature, and hence he purchased the land subject to the rights of the owner of the canal. If the right to use the same, therefore,
had ripened into a prescriptive right by the
lapse of time and the character of its use,
respondent purchased and holds the land
subject to appellant's right to maintain and
use the canal for the purposes for which it
was constructed, maintained, and used from
its inception. This is well illustrated by the
courts in the following cases: Jewett v. Hussey, 70 Me. 433, and Coventon v. Seufert, 23
Or. 548, 32 Pac. 508. In both of those cases it is held that, although the inception of
a prescriptive right rests in parol by the
permission of the owner of the land over
which it is claimed, yet, if the right of way
or ditch is used and enjoyed under a claim
of right to use and enjoy it as owners of
such property usually use and enjoy their
own, the claimant obtains a prescriptive
right to the use of the easement. In Arbuckle v. Ward, 29 Vt. 53, the court, in referring to this subject, says: "But the mere
fact of showing that the use began by permission of the landowner is not alone sufficient to defeat the prescription.'' In Coventon v. Seufert, supra, the Supreme Court
of Oregon, in passing on how a right to use
an irrigating ditch over the lands of another
may be acquired by use, states the law in
the following language: "That the use began by permission does not affect the prescriptive right if it has been used and exercised for the requisite period under claim
of right. * * * If the use of the way is
under a parol consent given by the owner of
the servient tenement to use it as if it were
legally conveyed, it is a use as of right
• • • The plaintiffs have used the ditch

as if it had been legally conveyed to them^.
that is, they have exercised such acts o#
ownership over it as a man would over h|{
own property—and the court must presuiu*
in the absence of any evidence to the con*
trary that the settlement was a parol con*
sent or transfer * * * of the right to
use the ditch, and hence it was a use as of
right." The court also held that, in view
that the party who claimed the easement
had used it for the purposes intended for *
period longer than would create a prescrip.
tive right, "the burden of proving that plain,
tiffs held possession by license or indulgence
was cast upon the defendants." To the same
effect, see Jones on Easements, f 1S2.
[31 Keeping in mind, therefore, the per.
manent character of the canal in question
and the purposes for which it was construct.
ed, used, and maintained, and that such use
had been for a period longer than 20 yean,
we are forced to the conclusion that the
mere fact that the court found that the c*.
nal was originally constructed "with the consent of the then owner of the land" cannot
affect appellant's prescriptive fight. If such
were not the law, then in this state, in
view of the arid character of the land embraced within its borders, but few irrigating
ditches could now be maintained. This if
apparent to all, for the reason that in many
if not most instances such ditches were at
least in part constructed over lands owned
by others either with the express or implied
permission or consent of the owners thereof.
If the owners of lands over which ditches
have been thus constructed can now claim,
as is claimed by respondent, that the owners and users of those ditches have acquired
no right to maintain them for the reason
that the ditches or canals were in fact constructed with the consent of the original
owners of the lands, and hence the ditch
users are mere licensees, and their ditches,
flumes, and canals are maintained and used
only by the sufferance or indulgence of the
landowners, then the law has proved to be
a mere delusion and a snare. In settling
and reclaiming the arid lands much that in
early days was deemed entirely worthless
has now acquired considerable value. Over
such lands miles of ditches, flumes, and canals were constructed with either the express or implied consent of the owners thereof. Can such owners, after a lapse of ail
these years, now treat the owners of the
ditches as mere trespassers? We think not
Upon the other hand, we are of the opinion |
that, although a canal, ditch, or flume may
have been constructed by a person on or over
lands owned by another with the consent or
permission of such other owner, yet, if the
owner of the canal, ditch, or flume, or his
assignee, has used and maintained the same
in the same manner as if the same were
constructed over his own lands, and where
such use and maintenance has continued uninterrUDtedlv and
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than twenty years, in such event thej spondent along the ditch, and to use so mucn
of the ditch has acquired a right to thereof on either side of the ditch as may
and maintain the same perpetually as be necessary to make all necessary repairs
and to clean out said ditch at all reasoncasement
view of the foregoing, what were the able times, and that appellant is liable only
its of appellant with respect to entering for the abuse of such right; that in this
the lands of respondent to repair and case no such abuse is shown, and hence the
out the ditch or canal in question? judgment against appellant cannot prevail.
right of the owner of an easement is
The judgment is reversed, and the cause
ibly stated by Mr. Jones in his ex- is remanded to the district court, with di; work on Easements, § SI4, in the fol- rections to strike from the findings that porwords: "The owner of a dominant tion indicated in italics and inserted therein
ite^ having an easement has a right to on August 26, 1911, to vacate the conclusions
iter upon the servient estate, and make re- of law and to modify the same to conform
necessary for the reasonable and con- to the law herein stated, and to enter judgit use of the easement, dcing no unnec- ment dismissing the action, and to apporiry injury to the servient estate." A tion the costs as in the judgment of the
Ijfcrge number of cases in support of the doc- court may be just and equitable. Appellant
are collated by the author in a foot- to recover costs in this court.
to the section aforesaid to which we reMcCARTT and STRADP, JJ., concur.
the reader. The doctrine is also well
lostrated and applied to an irrigating ditch
rthe Supreme Court of California in Joseph
(A*erf 108 Cal. 517, 41 Pac. 422. The findIn the case at bar "that in performing JOHNSON T. UTAH CONSOL. MINING CO.
(Supreme Court of Utah. June 7, 1912.)
work necessary thereto no unnecessary
MASTER
AND SERVANT (§ 221*)—INJURIES TO
ige or injury was done to the ground of
SERVANT —PROMISE TO REPAIR — MASTER'S
plaintiff" while not as specific as could LIABILITY—ASSUMED
RISK.
desired, yet must be construed to mean
Where a master has made a promise to
what appellant by its servants and em- repair a defect, the master and not the servant
Fte had a right to do, namely, to enter assumes the risk of injury caused thereby withsuch time after the promise as would be
respondent's land along the canal or in
reasonably allowed for performance and within
in question for the purpose of repair- a period which would not preclude all reasonand cleaning out the same, and, if in do- able expectation that the promise might be
;.the work no unnecessary injury was done kept
[Ed. Note.—-For other cases, see Master and
respondent's land, appellant cannot be Servant,
Cent. Dig. §§ 638-640, £42-645; Dec.
urged as a trespasser. Under the find- Dig. J 221.*]
as originally made, appellant therefore Appeal from District Court, Salt Lake
clearly within its rights in doing the County; M. L. Ritchie, Judge.
complained of. It was only after the Action by Nels Johnson against the Utah
[court thought that it was necessary to change Consolidated Mining Company. Judgment
| the findings to support the judgment for for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Re[Mxninal damages and costs that appellant's versed and remanded, with directions.
[servants were charged with having trespassPlaintiff brought this action to Tecover
•ed on respondent's land.
damages for personal <injuries alleged to
fo'W So far we have considered the question have been sustained by him on May 28, 1909,
[ tpon the theory that the findings as modified while employed as a miner in defendant's
Would make the appellant liable as a tres- mine in Bingham Canyon, Utah.
: passer. If the amendment by the court be The complaint, in substance, alleges that
^Considered and applied literally as written. defendant, a corporation, owns and operates
[Ik may well be doubted whether appellant the Highland Boy Mine in Bingham Canf%ouid be liable, even though the finding yon, Utah; that on the day of the injury
r.Were proper and true in fact. If appellant's plaintiff was employed in the capacity of a
^workmen trespassed on ground not neces- miner and machineman in a certain stope
ffary for said work" willfully, unnecessarily, on the eight and a half level of the mine;
Kind when not acting within the scope of that defendant carelessly failed and neglect[tiieir duties or employment in repairing or ed to furnish plaintiff a reasonably safe
^eaning out the canal, they, and not appel- place in which to perform the work required
it, should have been held as trespassers, of him under his contract of employment:
^e, however, do not desire to base the de- that plaintiff, after he began work, appreion upon such narrow ground. What we hended that the earth and rock over the
is that under the facts found by the point where he was at work was unsound
t the ditch or canal constitutes an ease- and required timbering in order to make the
&nt over respondent's land which appellant place reasonably safe, notified defendant's
ad a right to maintain, and for that pur- shift boss of the condition, and told him that
has a right to go upon the land of re- the place needed timbering; that the shift
^«~ V ^ . N O Series * Rep'r Indexes
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being so, the court should have ordered the
jury to return a verdict of not guilty on
account of former jeopardy, and erred in
not so doing. State v. Gomez, 58 Mont
177, 190 P. 982.
The judgment appealed from is reversed
and the cause remanded with direction to
dismiss the action.

4. Easemeats <§=>50
Secondary easements can be exercised
only when necessary and in such a reasonable manner as not to needlessly increase
burden on servient tenement.

5. Easements C=>53
The owner of dominant estate having
easement has right to enter on servient estate and make repairs necessary for reasonJOHNSON, C J., and ERICKSON, able and convenient use of easement, doing
ANDERSON, and MORRIS, JJ., concur. no unnecessary injury to servient estate.
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LADEN et al. v. ATKESON.
No. 8135.
Supreme Court of Montana.
June 28, 1941.
Rehearing Denied Sept 26, 1941.
1. Easements <S=>I
Waters and water courses €=>I53
Generally "easement" is a right which
one person has to use the land of another
for a specific purpose or a servitude imposed
as a burden upon land, as for example, an
easement in a ditch through the land of another.
See Words and Phrases, Permanent
Edition, for all other definitions of
"Easement".
2. Easements C=?53
The right to enter upon servient tenement for purpose of repairing or renewing
artificial structure, constituting aa. ^asem^nt,
is called a "secondary easement", which is a
mere incident of the easement that passes by
express or implied grant or is acquired by
prescription.
See Words and Phrases, Permanent
Edition, for all other definitions of
"Secondary Easement".

6. Easements <S=>40
Waters and water courses <£> 156(2)
When the use of a thing is granted, everything is granted by which grantee may
reasonably enjoy such use, that is, rights
that are incident to something else granted,
such as water and ditch rights.
7. Waters and water courses ©=3l58|/2(l)
In suit by owners of a ditch right across
defendant's lands, to quiet title to easement
across defendant's lands for purpose of keeping ditch in repair, evidence warranted action taken by trial court in decreeing to owners the use of a particular route across defendant's land, on ground that such route
was usual and customary mode of entering
defendant's lands for purpose of repair of
ditch, and was a reasonable route.
8. Easements @=>53
An easement for travel across servient
tenement is a "property right" belonging exclusively to dominant owners, who are responsible for the necessary upkeep of the
way in so far as dominant owners' use of
way is concerned.
See Words and Phrases, Permanent
Edition, for all other definitions of
"Property Right".

9. Easements e=>49
Dominant owners liaving easement for
travel over servient tenement cannot legally
be permitted to roam all over the servient
tenement and cannot select a new route of
travel without consent of owner of servient
tenement whenever the particular route set
aside for dominant owners becomes founderous, impassible or merely inconvenient, and
duty is primarily on dominant owners to re3. Waters and water courses <§=>I56(7)
pair the route rather than materially deviA person having an easement in a ditch ate therefrom.
running through the land of another may go
upon the servient land and use so much 10. Easemeits &»50, 55, 64
An owner of easement over servient
thereof on either side of the ditch as may be
required to make all necessary repairs and tenement mist use easement in such a manto clean out the ditch at all reasonable times. ner as not to inure the rights of owner nf

servient tenement, and easement owner exceeding his rights either in the manner or
the extent of use, or entering upon or using
servient tenement for unauthorized purposes, is guilty of a "trespass", and owner of
servient tenement can maintain action
against owner of easement, although no actual damages have been sustained by owner of
servient tenement
See Words and Phrases, Permanent
Edition, for all other definitions of
"Trespass".
11. Easements 0 6 4

16. Easements 0 4 7

A material change of location of easement cannot be made without consent of
servient owner, in absence of showing of prescriptive or legal right to change.
17. Waters and water courses €=>I58'/2(I)
A judgment properly awarded to persons having a ditch right across defendant's
land, the use of so much of defendant's land
on either side of ditch as might be reasonably necessary for maintenance and repair
of ditch, notwithstanding that no absolute
amount of land on either side of ditch was
granted.

An action for damages by owner of
servient tenement will lie against owner of
easement on due proof of abuse of easement
Appeal from District Court, Fifth Disrights.
trict, Beaverhead County; H. G. Rodgers,
12. Waters and water courses €=»l5ftf/2(l)

A judgment awarding to owners of a
ditch right across defendant's land, an easement across defendant's land to keep ditch
in repair, and designating a described route
to be used at all times that such route was
reasonably susceptible of travel, and authorizing owners to use such other route as
would afford owners a reasonable and practicable means of ingress to and egress from
ditch whenever described route was not reasonably susceptible of travel, did not place
burden of repair on defendant, but owners
had duty of repairing described route where
reasonably practicable.
13. Waters and water courses G=>t5By2(l)
Where owners of a ditch right across defendant's land needed dam or other artificial
structure or device in order to take their water from river, owners were properly awarded so much of defendant's land at head of
ditch and along bank of river as might be
reasonably needed for constructing, maintaining or repairing dam in river near head
of ditch, and such award did not give owners unrestricted right to construct dam anywhere in river they might desire.
14. Waters and water courses <§=>I56(7)
An owner of easement to maintain dam
has right to repair breastwork of dam and
banks at sides of dam, and has right to go
on land of servient tenement for such purpose, and has further right to restore dam
that has been carried away by a freshet
15. Waters and water courses <§=*I56(7)
In repairing a ditch or water race, owner of easement has incidental right to adjacent soil of servient tenement if repairs can«~* ho made in any other way.

Judge.
Suit by Patrick Laden and another
against Arthur L. Atkeson to quiet title to
certain alleged easement rights in defendant's lands. From the judgment, the defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
John Collins, of Dillon, for appellant.
T. F. McFadden, of Dillon, for respondents,
ERICKSON, Justice.
Plaintiffs are the owners of certain agricultural lands in Beaverhead county, and a
water right appurtenant thereto in the
Beaverhead river. Water is carried to
their lands through certain ditches and
sloughs located on the lands of defendant.
A dam is maintained near a point in the
river from which the main diversion ditch
is taken. To keep the dam and ditches
leading therefrom in repair, plaintiffs must
enter upon defendant's lands with dam
building materials and other paraphernalia
and vehicles for those purposes.
It is alleged in the complaint that plaintiffs entered upon defendant's lands in furtherance of these purposes from March,
1931, until May, 1937, at which latter time
defendant instructed plaintiffs to desist and
refrain from so doing, or persist at their
own risk. Plaintiffs refrained and thereafter instituted this suit for the purpose of
quieting title to certain alleged easement
rights in defendant's lands. They were
successful before the lower court, sitting
without a jury, and were adjudged entitled
to enter defendant's lands over a certain
described road in order to reach the head
of their diversion ditch, and also were giv-
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en the use of whatever lands on either side
of the ditches v.-ere reasonably necessary
to plaintiffs' repair thereof. The ditch
right across defendant's lands is not contested. From the judgment and decree defendant brings this appeal.
The errors assigned complain, in addition
to the granting cf any right in plaintiffs to
travel across defendant's lands, of the extent and general:ty of the court's findings
and judgment, as follows: "(1) In granting to plaintiffs the right to travel over defendant's lands 'upon and across said lands
by such other rcute as will afford them a
reasonable and practicable means of ingress to and egress from the head of their
said Diversion Ditch under all the conditions then obtaining/ (2) In granting to
plaintiffs the right to travel at will, across
appellant's lands 'by such a route as will
afford them a reasonable and practicable
means of ingress to and egress * * V
(3) In awarding to plaintiffs a right not
only to maintain the dam already constructed upon appellant's lands, but also 'to
use so much and such parts of said lands
at the head of said Diversion Ditch and
along the easterly bank of said Beaverhead
River, as may be reasonably needed and required for the purpose of constructing a
dam in said River.' (4) In permitting the
plaintiffs to deviate from the alleged line of
travel described b paragraph XVI of the
Findings whenever that line 'is not reasonably susceptible of travel.' (5) The findings do not support the conclusion that a
right of way for travel across the land of
defendant was selected and used in such a
definite way as to impress an easement upon that land. (6) The effect of the decree
is to give to plaintiffs the use of an indefinite amount of defendant's land, as a
secondary easement. (7) The evidence is
not sufficient to warrant the establishment
of a right of way, of indefinite width, for
•travel, upon either side of plaintiffs' ditch."

«uuu
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court did not recognize a prescriptive right
in plaintiffs, but rather "a right in the nature of a secondary easement."
[1] Generally speaking, "an easement
has been asserted to be a right which one
person has to use the land of another for
a specific pi^pose or a servitude imposed as
a burden upon land." 17 Am J u r . sec. 2, p.
923. For example, an easement in a ditch
through the land of another. Dahlberg v.
Lannen, 84 Mont. 68, 274 P. 151.
[2,3] "The right to enter upon the
servient tenement for the purpose of repairing or renewing an artificial structure,
constituting an easement, is called a 'secondary easement,' a mere incident of the
easement that passes by express or implied
grant, or is acquired by prescription." 2
Thompson en Real Property, p. 343; 19 C.
J. sec. 208, p. 970; 26 Caljur. p. 163; and
Jones on Easements, sees. 811 and 812, pp.
653, 654. To illustrate: "A person having
an easement in a ditch running through
the land of another may go upon the servient land and use so much thereof on either
side of the ditch as may be required to
make all necessary repairs and to clean out
the ditch at all reasonable times." 17 Am.
Jur. sec. 108, p. 1004; Dahlberg v. Lannen,
supra; Felsenthal v. Warring, 40 Cal.App.
119, 180 P. 67.

[4,5] Khdred to the above is the
equally well-established rule that: "Such
secondary easements can be exercised only
when necessary and in such a reasonable
manner as not to needlessly increase the
burden upon the servient tenement." Jones
on Easements, sea 811, p. 653; 19 C.J., sec.
208, p. 970; 2 Thompson on Real Property,
p. 343. Or, as it is sometimes stated:
"The owner of a dominant estate having
an easement has the right to enter upon
the servient estate and make repairs necessary for the reasonable and convenient use
of the easement, doing no unnecessary ini.' On the trial of the cause much testimony jury to the servient estate." Jones on
'was introduced relative to the ways by Easements, sec. 814, p. 655; 17 Am.Jur.,
which plaintiffs and their predecessors sec. 108, p. 1304.
passed over defendant's lands in attending
to the dam and ditches. Whether the
[6] These rules are founded on the
efforts of counsel were directed toward maxim of the law, that when the use of a
proving or disproving a prescriptive right thing is granted, everything is granted by
in plaintiffs to cross by a certain prescribed which the grantee may reasonably enjoy
route, and the success or otherwise of that such use, that is, rights that are incident to
proof, seems, under the law governing this something else granted,—here to water and
'case, immaterial in view of the court's ditch rights. Yellowstone Valley Co. v.
.findings and the evidence adduced in sup- Associated Mortgage Investors, 88 Mont.
port thereof. It is sufficient to *av *u~ TX o n n n o r ? ** » ^ —
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son on Real Property, p. 343; 19 C.J., sec. absence of that preponderative showing,
208, p. 970; 26 CaLJur. p. 163.
we have no alternative but to affirm the
lower court in respect to the route granted.
[7] With these general rules we agree.
In this situation, we think a rehearsal of
In reviewing the lower court's findings and
the evidence would serve no useful purjudgment, under the guidance of these
pose.
rules, the principal question presented, and
[8] In paragraph IX of the judgment
in our opinion determinative of all the issues, is, Does the court's decision, based and decree the court recognizes in plaintiffs
upon the evidence, decree to plaintiffs prac- the right to proceed to the head of the
tical and reasonable ways of travel upon diversion ditch over the particular road
defendant's lands for the necessary mainte- described, "at all times the same is reasonnance of their irrigation system, inflicting ably susceptible of travel; and if and when
no unnecessary injury to such lands or de- said roadway is not reasonably susceptible
of travel, the plaintiffs shall during such
fendant's use thereof?
From the voluminous record we have times pass over, upon and across said lands
concluded that possibly more than one by such other route as will afford them a
route, does exist across defendant's lands to reasonable and practicable means of inthe head of plaintiffs' diversion ditch. The gress to and egress from the head of their
question as to the particular route that will said 'Diversion Ditch' under all of the conresult in the minimum of injury to defend- ditions then obtaining/' Defendant comant's lands, having in mind his convenience plains of this holding because, he asserts,
in the use thereof, was determined by the it fails to take into account one well-escourt to be the precise way alleged to have tablished rule relative to secondary easebeen used by plaintiffs in the matter of at- ments, namely, that there is no burden upon
tending to their irrigation system upon de- the servient owner (defendant here) in the
fendant's lands. The record amply sup- absence of an agreement, to keep in repair
ports and justifies the action taken by the for the dominant owners the means necescourt in decreeing to plaintiffs the use of sary to the enjoyment of the primary easethe way just mentioned. Despite any evi- ment—here the roadway to the head of the
dence tending to show some deviation from diversion ditch. 17 Amjur., sec. 108, p.
the particular line of travel alleged, it is 1003, and 19 C.J., sec. 228, p; 980. The
significant and compelling in support of easement for travel upon defendant's lands
the court's findings that the way decreed is a property right belonging exclusively
to plaintiffs' use constituted the only road- to the plaintiffs, the dominant owners (17
way across defendant's lands reasonably A m j u r , sec. 108, p. 1003), and they are
responsible for the necessary upkeep of the
susceptible to their needs and purposes.
way in so far as their own use of it is conIn our opinion, the way decreed to cerned.
plaintiffs for purposes of going to and from
[9-11] Dominant owners cannot legalthe head of their diversion ditch constituted
a reasonable one under the record. There ly be permitted to roam all over the serviis evidence that this particular way, or ap- ent tenement in cases such as this; nor
proximately so, had been used for a num- can thej select a new route of travel, withber of years by plaintiffs and predecessors out the consent of the servient owner,
of a much earlier time in the matter of the whenever the particular route set aside
maintenance of the irrigation system in- for tha: purpose becomes founderous, imvolved. It substantially appearing that passable, or merely inconvenient.
The
this was the usual and customary mode of duty is primarily upon them, in such inentering upon defendant's lands for pur- stances, to repair their route rather than
poses of repair, we are inclined to believe materially deviate therefrom.
17 Am.
that that showing constitutes good evidence Jur., sec. 88, p. 989. In this regard Corpus
of the reasonableness of the route used in Juris states the rule to be: "One having
the absence of a showing to the contrary. an easement in another's land is bound to
The record does not preponderate with use it in such a manner as not to inure
evidence of any other route or way de- the rigits of the owner of the servient
signed to accommodate plaintiffs' needs in tenement. If the owner of an easement
a manner less injurious to defendant's exceeds his rights either in the manner or
* „ j „ +v,o« fit A wav awarded, or one more the extent of its use, or if he enters upon
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a trespass and the servient owner may
maintain such action, although no actual
damages have been sustained by him.'*
19 CJ., sec. 247, p. 989. In other words, an
action for damages will lie on due proof of
abuse of the easement right. Holm v.
Davis, 41 Utah 200, 125 P. 403, 44 L.RA^
N.S., 89.
[12] The judgment, we believe, needs
no modification as to this holding. We do
not think it may be so broadly interpreted
as defendant fears. That there may be no
misunderstanding of it, we have here set
out the controlling rules with respect to
the matters covered by finding No. 9.
Plaintiffs, depending upon the factual situation, must repair their way where reasonably practicable; otherwise the possibility would exist of having the burden
upon the servient tenement needlessly increased contrary to the underlying law of
all easements.
[13,14] Complaint as to the court's
award to plaintiffs of the use of "so much
and such parts of said lands [of defendant] at the head of said 'Diversion Ditch*
and along the easterly bank of said Beaverhead River, as may be reasonably needed
and required for the purpose of constructing a dam in said River near the head of
said 'Diversion Ditch' or for the purpose
of making any repairs necessary to the
maintenance of said dam" etc., is without
merit. As before noted, the ditch right
in plaintiffs is not contested and it apparently is admitted by all, that in order for
plaintiffs to take their water from the
river a dam or some other artificial structure or device is needed for the purpose.
Here a dam in the river serves that purpose. In Jones on Easements, sec. 814, p.
655, the following observation is made in
that connection: "An easement to maintain a dam necessarily involves the right to
repair it, and this involves also the right
to go upon the land for that purpose. The
easement includes not merely the right to
maintain and repair the breastwork of the
dam, but also the banks at the sides of it,
and to go upon the land of the servient
tenement for that purpose. It also includes the right to restore a dam that has
been carried away by a freshet."
[15] In
the author
jacent soil
language:

the same test, sec. 820, p. 659,
recognizes the right to use adfor purposes of repair in this
"In repairing a ditch or water-

rap** *k~ ~ . « ~ — -* *«
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incidental right to use the adjacent soil for
this purpose, in case the repairs cannot be
made in any other way. The fact that the
earth so used is the property of the owner
of the servient tenement does not settle
the question whether the owner of the
easement may take it for the purpose of
making repairs. The owner of the easement is privileged to repair in all cases
where the easement cannot be enjoyed
without repairs; and in making them, he
may dig up the soil and otherwise use and
encumber it, doing no more injury than is
necessary, when such course is indispensable to the enjoyment of the easement.'"
[16] The court's award is "for the purpose of constructing a dam in said River,
near the head of said 'Diversion Ditch' or
for the purpose of making any repairs,"
etc. We do not interpert this as being an
unrestricted award to plaintiffs permitting
them to construct a dam anywhere in the
river they may desire, as appellant here
seems to fear, but rather that plaintiffs are
granted the right to maintain their dam
near the head of the diversion ditch. A
material change of location, of course,
could not be made without the consent of
the servient owner, absent a showing of
prescriptive or other legal right thereto.
19 C.J., sec. 232, p. 982.
[17] With respect to the award to plaintiffs of the use of so much of defendant's
lands on either side of their ditches as
may be reasonably necessary for purposes
of maintenance and repair, we find no
fault. What is said above relative to the
dam is equally applicable to the ditches.
True, the amount allowed for such purposes is indefinite and uncertain. In the
very nature of such an easement the extent
thereof cannot be predetermined with certainty. It may be that portions of plaintiffs' ditches may never need attention other than casual inspection. Naturally, then,
little or no land on either side of such portions will be needed for purposes of repair
or otherwise. Other parts of the system
nay need constant attention and repair,
in which event the secondary easement requirements of plaintiffs may be much
greater. The court's judgment in that instance, as in all others, limits the use by
plaintiffs to a reasonable amount of defendant's land. That the term "reasonable" is relative, we concede, but in each
instance the amount used would constitute
a question of fact, determination nf wVnVVi

886

Mont.

116 PACIFIC REPORTER 2d SERIES

reasonable usage had been abused. As before noted, action will lie for such abuse.
Omniscient or occult indeed would be
the vision of the court that could foresee
the precise amounts of land to be needed
for repairs and maintenance along the
ditches by plaintiffs in the future. Compare Xeville v. Loudon Irrigating Canal,
etc., 73 Colo. 548, 242 P. 1002. Had the
award along either side of the ditches been
of continuous strips of 10, 15, 20 or any
other specific number of feet, the court
might have been subject to the correction
necessitated in Knudson v. Frost, 56 Colo.
530, 139 P. 533, 535, where the court in
condemning such a specific award stated:
"It will be seen from what has been said
that the judgment of the court, whether
based upon the oral agreement or upon
such rights as follow the written grant,
and as incident thereto, was erroneous in
that it granted an absolute easement in two
strips of land, each 20 feet wide and on
either side of plaintiffs' ditch. This gives
the plaintiffs the absolute right to the use
of all this land at all times and whether
necessary for the purpose or not, while
for the purpose of repair they may require
only the use of defendant's lands for the
necessary distance on either side of plaintiffs' ditch in certain places and at certain
times; yet it cannot be said that this is
necessary on all parts of defendant's lands
along the right of way, nor at all times.
The right is based upon necessity, and the
use is confined to the times, places, and
extent necessary."

It should be noted that in contrast to
Knudson v. Frost, supra, the court in the
present case expressly limited plaintiffs'
use of defendant's land on either side of
the ditches to an amount "reasonably
needed and required for the purposes of
cleaning or inspecting said ditches, or making any repairs thereto necessary to the
maintenance thereof." By that holding the
court grounded its judgment on the very
thing which the court in Knudson v. Frost
deemed so essential, namely, the necessity
of the case. No absolute amount is here
granted, but only a reasonable amount
which in turn is contingent upon the necessity of entering upon the land for the purposes of maintenance and repair.
In conclusion we repeat that in the very
nature of plaintiffs' right to go upon defendant's lands, a secondary easement
right for the purpose of obtaining full enjoyment of their primary easement consisting of their ditch right, including the
dam in the river, they could not be foreclosed of a reasonable exercise of that
privilege, nor successfully interfered with
by injunction or otherwise in the absence
of a showing of abuse of those rights.
We have considered all the specifications
of error, but find no reversible error therein.
The judgment is affirmed.
JOHNSON, C. J., and ANGSTMAN,
ANDERSON, and MORRIS, JX, concur.
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defense to its action based upon breach of
warranty. After having admitted that evidence, the trial court refused to give to the
jury any instructions on the law in this
state on contributory negligence and comparative negligence, even though the defendant submitted proposed instructions on
that subject Both the admission of such
evidence and the refusal to give such instructions are Cambelt's major assignments of error on this appeal.
We now refuse to consider the propriety
of the trial court's action, indulging in the
presumption that the general verdict was
reached by the jury on the ground that
there was no construction contract between
the parties, a defense to which the claimed
errors do not pertain. As expressed in my
dissenting opinion in Barson v. Squibb,
supra, I would not follow such practice in
our appellate review for the reasons discussed and based upon the authority cited
therein.
For what little consolation it may be to
Cambelt, if the jury strictly followed the
instructions given them, any contributory
negligence or fault of Cambelt should not
have influenced their verdict. The instructions made it clear that if they found that
Cambelt delivered plans and specifications
to Dalton which were part of the agreement between them, and Dalton failed to
follow them and thereby constructed a
faulty and defective platform, they should
return a verdict in favor of Cambelt. Contributory negligence or fault on the part of
Cambelt was not mentioned as a factor
they should consider.

Harry THORSEN, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
Markay JOHNSON, and Bryce Johnson,
individually, and Markay Johnson and
Bryce Johnson, dba Gooseberry Estates, a partnership, Defendants and
Respondents.
GOOSEBERRY ESTATES, a partnership
consisting of Tokaco Enterprises (itself
a family partnership consisting of William T. Gardner and his children William Todd Gardner, Kari Ann Gardner,
and Corrina Ann Gardner), Latigo,
Inc., a corporation; Tell W. Gardner;
Bryce Johnson; Markay Johnson and
Leonard V. Elfervig, all dba Gooseberry Estates, a Utah Partnership, Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
Harry THORSEN and Donald Gates,
Defendants and Appellants.
No. 18960.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 5, 1987.
Landowner brought action against
downstream user for damages to proposed
real estate development caused when downstream user dredged inactive irrigation
ditch which coursed through development.
The Sixth District Court, Sevier County,
Don V. Tibbs, J., entered judgment in favor
of owner. The downstream user appealed.
The Supreme Court, Howe, J., held that:
(1) evidence supported finding that downstream user exceeded and abused right to
enter upon owner's land to clean ditch and
that he was liable for damages, and (2)
damages found were based upon erroneous
measure.
Affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part
Zimmerman, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result
n n . k A m T *n~j
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1. Waters and Water Courses <s=»247(l)
the ditch. Gooseberry contended that the
Evidence supported finding that down- ditch had long been abandoned, that anothstream user of irrigation water exceeded er ditch had been established in another
and abused his right to enter upon anoth- location to carry Thorsen's water, and that
er's land to clean irrigation ditch and that he did the dredging for the sole purpose of
he was thus liable for damages; dredging preventing the use of Gooseberry's land for
amounted to substantial widening and a planned subdivision to which he, as a
deepening of ditch whereby large number nearby landowner, was opposed. The case
of trees were uprooted and excessive was tried before the court without a jury,
and the trial judge made a personal inspecamount of earth and rocks excavated.
tion of the property. In entering judgment
2. Damages ®=>138
in favor of Gooseberry, the trial court
Generally measure of damages for inmade findings of fact which are not clear
jury to real property is difference between
as to whether the court found that the
value of property immediately before and
ditch had been abandoned prior to the
immediately after injury.
dredging. However, at the oral argument
3. Waters and Water Courses <s=>247(l)
of this case before this Court, counsel for
Damages to proposed real estate devel- Gooseberry admitted that the trial court
opment when downstream user dredged in- did not find an abandonment and that Thoractive irrigation ditch which coursed sen had an easement through Gooseberry's
through development were arrived at based land for the ditch.
upon erroneous measure; there was no eviNevertheless, in other findings of fact,
dence supporting trial court's finding that the court found that the dredging by Thorlots had a fair market Talue of $6,000 be- sen greatly exceeded the mere cleaning of
fore ditch was enlarged or that ditch totally the ditch and amounted to a substantial
destroyed land, and expert's appraisal was widening and deepening of the ditch wherebased on assumption that no one had law- by a large number of trees were uprooted
ful irrigation ditch easement through lots, and an excessive amount of earth and
which was an erroneous assumption.
rocks were excavated Specifically, the
court found that the ditch "should not have
Norman H. Jackson, Richfield, for appel- been cleaned or dug up in the manner that
it was and if there had been any right at all
lants.
Ken Chamberlain, Richfield, for respon- it would have been merely the right of
running a plow through the area, the right
dents.
merely to handclean the ditch and it would
have delivered more water under the cirHOWE, Justice:
cumstances than it will at the present
This is an appeal from a judgment in
time." The evidence fully supports the
favor of Gooseberry Estates, a partnership,
findings of fact and conclusions of the
against Harry Thorsen and Donald Gates
court that Thorsen exceeded and abused
(hereinafter Thorsen) for damages to a prohis right to enter upon Gooseberry's land
posed real estate development in Sevier
to clean the ditch and that he is liable for
County caused when Thorsen dredged an
damages.
inactive irrigation ditch which coursed
through the development.
[2,3] Thorsen further contends that the
[1] Thorsen was a downstream user of damages found against him were excessive
the irrigation water and contended that he and based upon an erroneous measure. Alhad the right to enter upon Gooseberry's though there are exceptions and variaproperty for the lawful pirpose of cleaning tions,1 generally the measure of damages
1. Another measure of damages, discussed in the
dissent, is the cost of restoring the damaged

498 P.2d 648 (1972), we refused to employ that
measure of damages where lilacs growing
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for injury to real property is the difference
between the value of the property immediately before and immediately after the injury (often referred to as the "Diminution in
Value" rule). Pehrson v. Saderup, 28
Utah 2d 77, 498 P.2d 648 (1972); Brereton
v. Dixon, 20 Utah 2d 64, 433 P.2d 3 (1967);
22 AmJur.2d Damages § 132. The trial
court apparently endeavored to apply this
measure of damages when it announced:
The court finds that there were nine lots
which were totally destroyed, and the
court sets the value of $6,000 per lot and
in its present condition and not being
improved based upon the work up to that
time; the plaintiffs are awarded a judgment of $54,000. That's based upon
$6,000 per lot for the nine lots.
This analysis is flawed in two respects.
There was no evidence that the "lots" had
a fair market value of $6,000 before Thorsen enlarged the ditch, and there was no
evidence that the ditch totally destroyed
nine "lots." The following factual background is helpful to an understanding of
why the trial court erred.
On May 14, 1979, Gooseberry entered
into a contract with Bryce Johnson to purchase from him 94.47 acres of land for a
total of $66,750 or $706.57 per acre. Johnson had acquired the 94.47 acres on July
30, 1978, for the same price. Gooseberry
contemplated subdividing 50.59 acres of
that tract into a development of thirtythree lots, containing 1.53 acres per lot.
During the seventeen months which
elapsed from May 14, 1979, when Gooseberry purchased the land, to October of
1980, when Thorsen damaged the land, no
improvements were placed upon the property by Gooseberry. A preliminary subdivision plat was prepared, but a final plat had
not been approved or recorded. Gooseberry expended $8,400 for surveying, mapping, and platting. It also expended $7,100
in an attempt to drill a well to provide
culinary water for the lots. Adequate water was not found. At the time of trial,

Gooseberry still owed $16,000 on the purchase of the property. Gooseberry put on
testimony that the projected cost of the
improvements was $171,125, but this did
not include a central sewage system which
the county kter required.
The $6,000-per-lot damage found by the
lower court was apparently based on testimony given by an appraiser, Kenneth Esplin, that if and when the subdivision was
approved and recorded, water was made
available, and the improvements were in
place, the lots should sell for $12,000 each.
He opined that ten of the proposed lots
were damaged so as to reduce their potential value by 50 percent, or to $6,000 each.
Esplin admitted that he was not very familiar with the narket for mountain lots in
Sevier County where the property was located. He based his opinion on sales made
in the Cedar City and Fairview areas in
other counties. Counsel for Thorsen repeatedly objected to Esplin's testimony on
the grounds that it was speculative, conjectural, and irrelevant

that it would be unreasonable to there employ
that measure, but recognized that it might be
reasonable in a case where an ornamental tree

sonable since the value of an acre of similar
land would be SI,250 and restoration costs

The difficulty with Esplin's testimony,
and the court's judgment which was based
upon it, is that at the time Thorsen inflicted
damage upon the realty, the property was
in a pristine state exactly the same as when
it had been purchased seventeen months
earlier. It is true that Gooseberry had
expended $15,500 in preparations to improve it with the expectation that some day
it would become a subdivision of mountain
lots. However, before this expectation
could be realized, Gooseberry would have
to finish paying for the land, develop a
culinary water supply approved by the
health department, and install a central
sewage system. Then, county planning
and zoning approval of the final plat, together with approval by the County Commission, would have to be granted. Thereafter, financing for hundreds of thousands
of dollars worth of improvements would
have to be obtained. When the improve-
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ments were in place, buyers who were
ready and willing to pay $12,000 for each
of the thirty-three lots would have to be
found.
In viewing Gooseberry's land as a completed subdivision, Esplin and the trial
court lost sight of the fact that the measure of damages is the diminution of the
fair market value of the property immediately following the infliction of the damage—not what the property may be worth
when and if substantial sums of money are
expended to turn it into an improved subdivision. In State v. Tedesco, 4 Utah 2d 248,
291 P.2d 1028 (1956), a condemnation case
in which the jury was instructed to find the
fair market value of the property, we quoted with approval from Pennsylvania S. V.
R. Co. v. Cleary, 125 Pa. 442, 17 A. 46S
(1889).
It is proper to inquire what the tract is
worth, having in view the purposes for
which it is best adapted, but it is the
tract, and not the lots into which it might
be divided, that is to be valued
The
jury are to value the tract of land and
that only. They are not to determine
how it could best be divided into building
lots, nor conjecture how fast they could
be sold, nor at what price per lot. A
speculator or investor, in deciding what
price he could afford to pay, would consider the chances and probabilities of the
situation as then actually existing. A
jury should do the same thing. They are
not to inquire what a speculator might be
able to realize out of a resale in the
future, but what a present purchaser
would be willing to pay for it in the
condition it is now in.
More recently, the Supreme Court of Colorado in Department of Highways v. Schulhojf, 167 Colo. 72, 445 P.2d 402, 405 (1968).
quoted the above passage from Pennsylvania S. V.R. Co. v. Cleary and restated the
same rule as follows:
It is proper to show that a particular
tract of land is suitable and available for
subdivision into lots and is valuable for
that purpose. It is not proper, however,
to show the number and value of lots as

improper for the jury to consider an undeveloped tract of land as though a subdivision thereon is an accomplished fact
Such undeveloped property may not be
valued on a per lot basis, the cost factor
clearly being too speculative.
By fixing the damages based on a completed, improved subdivision, the trial court
valued the land before it was damaged at
$3,921 per acre, whereas it had been purchased seventeen months earlier at $706.57
per acre. This amounts to a 450 percent
increase in value—without a single improvement to the realty. Significantly, appraiser Esplin testified that the remaining
43.88 acres of the 94.47 acres purchased by
Gooseberry (which were not going to be
subdivided) had a fair market value of
$1,250 per acre. This was exactly the same
value per acre ascribed to the entire 94.47acre tract by Thorsen's appraiser, Joseph
S. Stott. Stott belonged to a firm which
had been marketing real estate in Sevier
County for seven years. Mountain subdivision lots had been advertised for sale and
listed with his agency. However, he testified, "in the years that I have been in the
business, we have yet to sell a mountain lot
out of our office.,,
Esplin's appraisal was also flawed because it was based on his assumption that
no one had a lawful irrigation ditch easement through the "lots." This was erroneous. As previously mentioned, at oral argument of this case before this Court,
counsel for Gooseberry Estates admitted
that the trial court did not find an abandonment and that Thorsen had an easement
for the irrigation ditch.
Additionally, while Esplin testified that
the ditch as enlarged by Thorsen would
reduce the potential value of any improved
lot from $12,000 to $6,000, he did not testify that the value of any of the proposed
lots was totally destroyed by the enlarged
ditch. To the contrary, he testified the
ditch diminished their potential value by 50
percent. Thus, there is no basis in the
evidence for the trial court's conclusion
that the value of the nine lots was totally
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The remainder of the proposed 1.53-acre
lots through which the ditch coursed was
undamaged2 and could be used at a minimum for grazing purposes. The entire
ditch occupied 1.08 acres (3,150 ft. long X
15 ft wide). This would be the maximum
land which could have been ^totally destroyed." It too assumes, contrary to the
admission of Gooseberry's counsel, that
Thorsen had no right at all to an easement.
Since the amount of damages found by
the trial court was arrived at by an erroneous method, we reverse the judgment and
remand the case to the trial court for reassessment of damages.
HALL, CJ., and STEWART,
Associate CJ., concur.
ZIMMERMAN, Justice (concurring in
the result):
I agree with Justice Durham's statement
of the law of damages. However, I agree
with the majority that the trial court made
several unjustified assumptions in fixing
the amount of damages. Therefore, I join
the majority in remanding the case for a
reassessment of damages. In making that
reassessment, I would hold tha: the trial
court should be guided by the broader damage principles discussed in Justice Durham's opinion.
DURHAM, Justice (concurring and
dissenting):
I join the majority opinion in affirming
the judgment as to liability, but dissent
from its treatment of the damage question.
The measure of damages for permanent
injury to land and damage to :rees was
recently treated by the Utah Court of Appeals in Ault v. Dubois, 739 P.2d 1117
(Utah Ct.App.1987):
Generally, the measure of damages for
permanent injury to land is the difference in the market value of the land
immediately before and immediately after the injury, but if the land may be
restored to its original condition the cost
of restoration may be used as the mea-

sure of damages if it does not exceed the
diminution in the market value.
Id. at 1120 (citations omitted). The opinion
correctly notes that the above standard is
not a rigid one and that "even when diminution in value is clearly the appropriate
measure of damages, evidence as to repair
costs is admissible for the purpose of helping [the fact finder] determine the loss of
value." Id. at 1121 (citations omitted).
In Brereton v. Dixon, 20 Utah 2d 64, 433
P.2d 3 (1967), this Court endorsed a flexible
rule particularly applicable for damages to
land associated with destruction of trees on
the realty.
When property has been damaged or
destroyed by a wrongful act the desired
objective is to ascertain as accurately as
possible the amount of money that will
fairly and adequately compensate the
owner for his loss.
Because of the fact that any attempt
at unvarying uniformity in applying either [the diminution in value rule or the
separate value rule], a third rule, which
we believe to be the better considered
and more practical one, has been applied.
It gives the injured party the benefit of
whichever of the two rules will best
serve the objective hereinabove stated of
giving him reasonable and adequate compensation for his actual loss as related to
his use of his property
If he wants
to maintain a fruit orchard, a wood lot,
or even a primitive area, though his property may be more valuable if turned to
an industrial or residential purpose, that
should be his prerogative; and if it is
wrongfully destroyed or damaged, the
wrongdoer should pay for the actual
damage he caused.
Id. at 66, 67-68, 433 P.2d at 5-6.
A few years later, in Pehrson v. Saderup, 28 Utah 2d 77, 498 P.2d 648 (1972), this
Court quoted with approval the following
language from Thatcher v. Lane Construction Co., 21 Ohio App.2d 41, 254 N.E.
2d 703 (1970):
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Where the presence of trees is essen- took in applying the diminution in value
tial to the planned use of property for a rule. In fact, I think he would have beea
homesite in accordance with the taste justified in using the restoration costs,
and wishes of its owner, where not un- within some reasonable limit, as a measure
reasonable and where such trees are de- of damages. Fifty-four thousand dollars,
stroyed by trespassers, the owner may as compared to the cost of replacing the
be awarded as damages the fair cost of destroyed trees (more than $100,000) seems
restoring his land to a reasonable ap- very reasonable to me. The majority's approximation of its former condition, if proach is, I believe, contrary to our case
such restoration be practical, without law supporting the principle of full compennecessary limitation to diminution in mar- sation within the overall limitation of reaket value of such land.
sonableness.
28 Utah 2d at 79, 498 P.2d at 650 (citing
Finally, I note that Utah Code Ann.
Thatcher, 21 Ohio App.2d at 49, 254 N.E.2d § 78-38-3 (1987), upon which plaintiffs apat 708). The Pehrson opinion goes on to parently did not rely, provides for the trestate what I believe to be a sound and just
bling of civil damages against "any person
rule: "In a determination of the appropriwho cuts down . . . or otherwise injures
ate measure of damages in this area, the
any tree . . . on the land of another person
cardinal principles are flexibility of ap. . . without lawful authority."
proach and full compensation to the owner,
within the overall limitation of reasonableness." Pehrson, 28 Utah 2d at 79, 498
(p | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM>
P.2d at 650.
The trial court in this case found as fact
that defendant Thorsen "willfully and intentionally . . . [made] a massive, senseless,
purposeless ditch across [plaintiffs'] premKarla KISHPAUGH (Kornmayer),
ises." A review of the numerous photoPlaintiff and Respondent,
graphs in the record explains the finding
v.
that the trial judge, after personal inspection of the land, was "shocked at the damRichard Bruce KISHPAUGH,
age which was done to the premises . . .
Defendant and Appellant.
and [had] grave doubts whether or not the
No. 20423.
property . . . can ever be used for the purposes for which they [sic] were bought by
Supreme Court of Utah.
the Plaintiffs." The evidence showed that
Nov. 6, 1987.
more than two hundred mature pine trees
and one hundred and seventy cedars over
Natural father filed petition to modify
eight feet tall were uprooted by defendant.
Plaintiffs' experts testified that replacing divorce decree to change custody. Materthem would cost approximately $275 per nal grandparents filed petition to obtain
tree and that the trees on the lots were guardianship over child. The Third District
extremely important to the development Court, Salt Lake County, Dean E. Conder,
and sale of the lots. Other testimony es- J.> awarded custody to grandparents. Fatablished that many lots would not even be ther appealed. The Supreme Court, Zimsaleable without grading and reseeding at merman, J., held that: (1) presumption faa cost of $80,000 without replacing any voring custody by natural parent was
trees. In short, although disputed, there rebutted and trial court was permitted to
was considerable evidence upon which the base custody award solely on its determinatrial court could rely in awarding $54,000. tion of the child's best interests once it
In view of the malice that motivated this found that all three requirements for rebut-
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conveyances of Stats lands
reservation of such right of Way, ]
ment had an existing right of
establish and maintain * -caMl?
land which State had su
veyed under a patent stating
veyance was subject to any rif
which might have been estabt
quired according to law and i
rights of way for ditches thai]
constructed by the United St
1953,65-2-3.
•#£+-.
'uiNHMlTflW)

2. Public Lands *=m*(l) '
In construing effect of*
grant, the law in force at t i n * ,
f in
is made controls,
* * &&

S. Public Lands *=>114(1)
The world at large is
UNITED STATES of America,
notice of a conveyance and 11
Plaintiff,
established by statute! a n d *
v.
a patent directly contrary to
S.08 ACBES OF LAND, MORE OB LESS, law is void to the extent of sockj
Situated IN BOX ELDEB COUNTY,
Utah, Utah Power and Light Company, L Evidence **5(«)
t^
et aL, and Unknown Others* Defend*
Court may take judicial
ants.
canals in addition to having
No. C129-4L
sides frequently have banks.
United States District Court
5. Waters and Water Courses'
D. Utah, N. D.
Construction and maint
Sept 13, 1962.
eight-foot banks along canal were ]
ably necessary to carry out aut
purposes
of canal and were within
Action by government to condemn
of
easement
that had been reserved A
a right of way for a canal across realty
construction
of
canaL'
owned by utility company. The District
Court, Christensen, J., held that right to & Eminent Domain €=*9S
maintain and operate a 50-foot boom on
Enlargement of easement cannot I
top of banks of the canal for cleaning considered as causing mere consequent!
canal was a part of the right of way damage not incidental to an actual takft
easement reserved by operation of orig- for which no recovery can be had.
inal grant of a right of way for construction of a canal by United States govern- 7. Eminent Domain <*=>2<10)
ment over land and exercise of such right
Waters and Water Courses 4=*222
would not result in an additional taking
Right to maintain and operate
which would have to be condemned
50-foot boom on top of banks of cam
for cleaning canal was a part of right <i
Decree accordingly.
way easement reserved by operation <J
original grant of a right of way for crij
struction of a canal by United Statd
L Waters and Water Courses S=»22S
Under Utah statute granting over government over land and exercise q
all lands owned by the State a right of such right would not result in an add
way for ditches constructed by the United tional taking which would have to t
States and requiring that all subsequent condemned. U.C.A.195S, 65-2-8.
'4

UNITED 8TATES T. 106 AOBES OF LAND, ETC
CiUs • • 306 F Jopp. 432 (1MB)

an easement holder may not
the servitude upon the grantor's
by enlarging on the easement
is entitled to do what is reasonfor full and proper enjoyof rights granted under the easein the normal development of the
'the dominant tenement.
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Nibbley on May 29 1917; that said land
has by mesne conveyances become the
property of the defendant Utah Power
and Light Company; and that the plaintiff already has the granted and reserved
right to construct a canal across said
land without paying the defendant more
than nominal compensation, estimated in
the declaration of taking to be One Dollar.

The defendant Utah Power and Light
Company does not contest the right of the
plaintiff to condemn a right of way in the
property in question but claims that it
is entitled to fair and just compensation
for the interest taken in the amount of
$350.00 per acre for the 8.08 acres, or
ISTENSEN, District Judge.
$1078.00, plus further compensation for
\ is an action brought by the United damages to its remaining interest in the
ltd America as plaintiff to condemn property taken and for consequential
of way across a parcel of real damage to the remaining portion of the
owned by the defendant Utah parcel of land involved or to the entire
and Light Company for the pur- generating or distributing system of
fif constructing a canal.
which the property taken is an integrated
use for which the real property part, in the amount of $18,900.00. The
it be taken is stated in the complaint Power Company asserts that the parcel
I a public use in connection with the of land of which the condemned portion
ion. operation and maintenance is a part was acquired by it for use as a
STHllard Canal, Weber Basin Proj- site for. towers to support high tension
The estate to be taken accord- wires to be integrated with its generat["to the complaint is a right of way ing and distriboting system; that the
<jbe r^afrr -if -wag ^
t T. Thurman, U. S. Atty., Craig
at, Asst U. S. Atty., Salt Lake
*ier plaintiff.
J. Bertoch, Sidney G. Baucom,
> City, for defendants.

•K'MII

rii i s

a

*f land 185 feet wide, containing 3.08
acres more or less, situated in Box Elder
fumnty, State of Utah. Subsequent proceedings have indicated that the Govern•aent believes that it is already entitle
*V the right of way sought to be con*
^tanned by virtue of a prior reservation,
as will be discussed more fully hereafter.
Actually it appears that the Government
rii seeking to condemn only any enlargement of the claimed existing easement
4hat may be found to result from its conr
tsmplated use.
* The plaintiff claims that the property
in question was acquired by the State of
Utah from the United States by a selection list transfer approved by the United
States Department of the Interior on
June 19,1907; that said land was patentid by the State of Utah to Charles W.

ing by Hie government, but that due to
the canal banks to be constructed on the
condemned property and the boom necessarily to be used on those canal banks for
maintenance of the canal, the Utah Power
and Light Company has had to redesign
its towers to increase their heights so
that the power lines suspended between
them and over the canal will be at a
height required by law to avoid contact
with plaintiff's equipment. It is alleged
that the increased cost of the construction of the higher towers compared with
those originally designed will amount to
$11,900.00. It is further contended that
the defendant Power Company will have
to bear $7,000.00 as additional cost to
strengthen a bridge which will accommodate the heavy equipment necessary to
the defendant's operations, since direct
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access by such heavy equipment without
the strengthened bridge will be cut off
by the proposed canal.
All of the other parties defendant have
either disclaimed or defaulted. The following facts have been stipulated between the plaintiff and the Utah Power
and Light Company:
The canal in question will have a maximum water gravity flow capacity of 950
cubic, feet per second and a maximum
flow capacity of 500 cubic feet per second
with a bottom width of SO feet and a
maximum water surface width of 70 feet.
It will be 90 feet wide inside the top of
the embankments and will have an overall width from embankment toe to embankment toe of approximately 180 feet
where it crosses the property of the
Power Company. Drains and ditches will
be constructed alongside the canal wherever necessary to carry off surface water.
The earth embankments along the sides
of the canal will have an average height
of 8 feet above the average ground level
of the said defendant's property. The
fair market value of the interest in the
land itself, as taken by the plaintiff in
this action, is $350.00 per acre.

by the taking, and if so, to what *Mr

tent"
The parties expressed in the p:
order the contested issues of law, in
dition to those implicit in the foregi
issue of fact, as:
-^
"(a) Whether or not plaintiff h a a | |
the reserved right to construct t h e | |
ditch known as the 'Weber CanaF^
across such real property with re^jjjj
spect to any and all of the acreage1,
classifications * * # by virtue of
the laws of the State of Utah with
out paying defendant Utah Power
and Light Company more than nom» V
inal compensation and
'•%;
"(b) Whether or not defendant ~
Utah Power and Light Company it
entitled to compensation for tlye alleged consequential damage, or cost"
of restoration, or reduction of mar»
*et value, ll you will, described
above."

This case is perhaps the only contested}
civil case in recent years in which I havil
been persuaded by counsel not to hold M J
actual pre-trial conference. Counsel i a | |
dicated a reluctance to go to the troul
of appearing in the Northern DiviaJ<
for the conference and indicated that
The sole contested issue of fact as reissues were simple and the evidence
served in the pre-trial order in the words,
be substantially stipulated. I theref*
of the parties is:
signed a stipulated "Pre-Trial Or<
"What is the amount of the conwithout holding an actual pre-trial
sequential damage done to defendference. Developments have indica
ants' remaining interest in the propthat even in the seemingly simple case**'f
erty taken for the easement and to
actual pre-trial conferences are bene-4
the remaining portion of the parcel
ficial and that rarely, if ever, can time^
of property out of which the easebe saved or the interest of justice proK
%
ment is carved, or to the remainder
moted by dispensing with them.
*
of the integrated power system. To
Implicit In the pre-trial order Is the
approach it another way, what is
indication
that defendant Power Comthe amount of expense necessary to
pany
did
not
contest the necessity for the!
enable the defendant to make its re"taking"
and
that the only issue of ultimaining land and its remaining inmate
fact
involved
damages. Both par*
terest in the land taken usable to the
ties,
at
the
time
the
execution of the
extent and for the same purpose it
pre-trial
order
was
under
consideration
was used or to be used prior to the
and
at
the
time
of
the
trial,
indicated
taking. To express the measurethat the damages to the Utah Power and
ment of damage in still a third alLight Company were occasioned, aside
ternative manner: Has the market
from the value of any interest in land
value of the entire power system of
actually taken, by the eight foot banks of
the defendant been reduced in value

UNITED STATES •. 3.06 ACRES OF LAND, ETC.
Cite « » 2 » F.Sopp. «S3 (1962)

^the canal and by the plan and necessity
of the government to operate from those
fbanks a 60 foot boom for the purpose of
'cleaning the canal. This combination,
j^the evidence established, necessitated the
raising, as compared with their acceptable height, of the planned towers supporting the Power Company's transmission lines which would not be necessary
were it not for the elevated banks and
the necessary boom, and which raising
entailed additional expense to the Power
Company of $11,900.00.
The court finds in the latter connection
that the defendant's increased cost of
construction of electrical facilities necessitated by plaintiff's contemplated use of
the land taken, including the utilization
of the boom for maintenance of the canal,
will be the sum of $11,900.00; that by
reason of the establishment of the canal
defendant's access to its remaining property by its necessary heavy equipment
will be destroyed unless the said defendant incurs an additional cost of $7,000.00
in supporting a public bridge designed,
"without such support, for merely ordinary vehicular traffic; and that by these
amounts the value of the defendant's integrated power system may fairly be regarded as depreciated by the taking.
These findings will become important
only if I am wrong in some or all of. my
other findings or conclusions.

655

sought to be condemned or confirmed in
the Government The significance of this
refinement became apparent only from
the briefs filed following the trial, which
briefs changed the original emphasis upon the question of whether the Government already had a right of way for the
maintenance of a canal across plaintiff's
land to one of whether, even though some
right of way existed, it included the right
to maintain eight foot banks along the
canal and the use of the boom in connection with the maintenance of the
canal.
The Government now maintains that
the question of the enlargement of a
right was not involved in the issues reserved in the pre-trial order and thus
should not be considered while the defendant Power Company points out that
the question of enlargement directly relates to the amount of damages to which
the Power Company is entitled within
the purview of the question of damages
expressly reserved in the pre-trial order.
I must obsenre, too, that the government
hardly can contend that this is only a
suit for a declaration that whatever
rights it seek* are included in an existing
reserved right of way when it has seen
fit not simply to ask for such a declaration, but to ask that any and all interests
of the defendant Power Company in the
land described be condemned for the purpose of permitting the Government to esNeither the pre-trial order nor the tablish and maintain the canal by means
evidence adduced at the trial indicated of all necessary structures and equipwhat part of this expense or depreciation ment.
would be due to the maintenance of the
[1] In 1905 the Legislature of the
elevated banks of the canal and what adState
of Utah enacted the following statditional part, if any, would be attributaute,
now
65-2-3 Utah Code Annotated
ble to the contemplated operation by the
1953,
which
reads as follows:
Government of the 60 foot boom in con"There is hereby granted over all
nection with the maintenance of the
lands
now or hereafter belonging
canal While the Government itself acto
the
state of Utah a right of way
cepted, during the course of the trial, the
for
ditches,
tunnels, telephone and
thesis that this proceeding was designed
transmission
lines, constructed by
to assure to it the right to operate such
authority
of
the
United States. All
boom and that it would be necessary for
conveyances of state lands hereafter
the Power Company to raise its transmismade shall contain a reservation of
sion lines to permit such operation, there
such right of way."
was no specification in the pre-trial order,
aor in notice of taking, that this operaIn 1907, after the enactment of this
tion was included as among the rights statute, the State of Utah acquired the

656

209 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT

land in question from the United States
Government In 1917 it was sold by the
State under patent to George W. Nibbley.
The grant in the patent contained the
following provision:
"Subject to any easement or right
of way as may have been established
or acquired according to law, over
the same or any part thereof and
subject also to all rights of way for
ditches, tunnels and telephone and
transmission lines that may have
been constructed by authority of the
United States."
The defendant contended at the time
of the trial that the effect of the patent
was to limit the reserved right of way
to easements established and perfected
while title to the property was still in
the State. There seems little doubt that
if the wording of the patent is accepted
at face value this might be the effect.
The defendant further contended that independent of the wording of the patent
itself, the State statute would have the
same effect On the latter point it cited
United States v. Pruden, 172 F.2d 603
(10 Cir. 1949), interpreting a similar
Oklahoma statute.
Recognizing the significant difference
between the wording of the patent and
the statute, and in harmony with the
views I expressed at the trial, I am of the
opinion that not the Pruden case but Ide
v. United States, 263 U.S. 497, 44 S.Ct .
182, 68 L.Ed. 407 (1924) controls the
resolution of this question for the following reasons: The Pruden decision was an
interpretation of the Oklahoma statute
which was in part at least based upon
Oklahoma decisions of which there are no
counterparts among the Utah adjudications. But more important, primary reliance was placed in Pruden upon the interpretation of the Federal statute governing the reservation of rights of way
for highway purposes, whereas, as pointed out in Ide, there is a directly analogous
Federal statute dealing with canals, on
the very language of which the Utah
statute is based, and which Ide interprets directly contrary to the conclusion
reached in Pruden.

I see no escape from the controlliqjl
effect of the Ide doctrine which u*t«rf
preted the very statute which Utah use|l
as the model for its own statute witH
reference to the reservation of a right ora
way for canals. See also Northern Pail
cific Railway Company v. United StateeJ
277 F.2d 615 (10 Cir. 1960); Green ia
Willhite, 160 F. 755 (Cir.C.DJdahel
1906); United States v. Andersoaa
109 F;Supp. 755 (D.C.E.D.Wash.l958>jj
United States v. Fuller, 20 F.Supp. 8SW
(D.C.Idaho 1937); Dopps v. Alderman^
12 Wash.2d 268, 121 P.2d 388 (1942^M
Nor does the fact that the patent Jjn
question uses language indicating a <ftJKl
ferent interpretation change the effecjS
of the statute, whether this circumstasRJS
be looked upon as one relating to the teM
islative history of the statute to be lookm
to in its interpretation or as an argument!
that the form of the patent could override?
the law itself. On the former subject^
the evidence indicated that while thian
particular form of the patent was utilised,]
in 1917, thereafter the State Land Boah^
changed the form of similar patents tfl
conform to the wording of the statuw
rather than to indicate that the rights
of way reserved applied only to canab^
that had been constructed theretofore*!
It is more reasonable to suppose that the*
Land Board discovered the invalidity <ra
the wording of the patent in question^
and changed other patents to confora^J
with the controlling law than to suppose^
that the Legislature of the State of UtaK •
by failing to pass a law correcting thej
form of the patent in question put its^
implied stamp of approval upon the io-^
terpretation of the Land Board. In view \
of this evidence' the case of State T.:.
Hatch, 9 Utah 2d 288, 342 P.2d UQ$|
(1959), so strongly relied upon by thrj
Power Company loses point
[2,3] In any event it is well settled*
that in construing the effect of a public*
grant such as a patent the law in fort*
at the time the grant is made controls*:
The world at large is charged with notice:
of a conveyance and its limitations estab*
lished by a statute, and a provision in %
patent directly contrary to governing law

UNITED STATES T. S.08 A0RE8 OF LAND, ETC.
CiU at 90S F.Supp. 652 (1M2)

e* void to the extent of such conflict
^Gieason v. White, 199 U.S. 64, 26 S.Ct
| » 2 , 60 L.E& 87 (1905); Morris v.
fUnited States, 174 U.S. 196,19 S.Ct. 649,
?43 L.Ed. 946 (1899); Burfenning v.
^Chicago S t P. M. & 0. Ry. Co., 168 U.S.
*ttl, 16 S.Ct. 1018, 41 L.Ed. 176 (1896);
IXnight v. United Land Ass'n., 142 U.S.
$W, 12 S.Ct 258, 35 L.Ed. 974 (1891);
flron Silver Min. Co. v. Campbell, 135
rU.S. 286, 10 S.Ct 765, 34 L.Ed. 155
I (1890); Glasgow v. Baker, 128 U.S. 660,
J18.Ct 154, 82 L.Ed. 513 (1888); Coffee
£jr. Groover, 123 U.S. 1,8 S.Ct 1, 31 L.Ed.
Tfl (1887); United States v. Stone, 2
J*all. 525, 69 U.S. 625, 17 L.Ed. 765
I<1865); Stoddard v. Chambers, 2 How.
§«4, 43 U.S. 284, 11 L.Ed. 269 (1844);
f The Mayor, etc. of New Orleans v. De
|Armas and Cucullo, 9 Pet 224, 11 Curt.
138, 34 U.S. 224, 9 L.Ed. 109 (1835);
f Polk's Lessee v. Wendal, 9 Cranch 87, 13
%V&. 87, 8 L.Ed. 665 (1815); United
i 8tates v. State of Washington, 233 F.2d
[ t i l (9 Cir. 1956). See also Burke v.
[Southern P. R. Co. 234 U.S. 669, 34
|&Ct 907, 58 L.Ed. 1527 (1914); United
^States v. Fuller, 20 F.Supp. 839 (D.C.
(Idaho, 1937) ; Walpole v. State Board of
£Land Com'rs., 62 Colo. 554, 163 P. 848
[(1917).
f I conclude that the Government with' eat reference to the condemnation proceedings had, and has, an existing right
of way to establish and maintain the
canal in question together with all *p: purtenances reasonably necessary for
i such canals.
r This brings us to the point which was
imot defined in the pre-trial order but
. which lurks within the issues specified
* and which now has been urged by the
defendant Power Company, i. e. that even
though a right of way for the maintenance of a canal exists, the elevation of
the banks to eight feet and the maintenance and operation of the boom necessitating the raising of the transmission
lines of the Power Company constitute
an enlargement of that right, which enlargement must be condemned and for
which compensation must be paid.
tOt F.Supp --42
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[4,5] I think it is a matter of common knowledge of which the court may
take judicial notice, that canals in addition to bottoms and sides frequently, if
not invariably, have banks. It is reasonable to suppose that the Legislature in
making provision for a reservation of
rights of way for canals contemplated
that the easement so reserved would be
for the purpose of constructing and maintaining banks of canals, among other
things. In this mountainous region
where hydraulic gradient must be maintained over irregular terrain it may not
be supposed that the maintenance of
canals without banks necessarily was contemplated. On the contrary, not only
may banks of some sort be deemed reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of
the easement reserved in favor of the
Government, but we must accept them as
within the contemplation of the statutes
reserving the easement
If the easement reserved includes the
right to maintain canal banks, I cannot
find that their construction and maintenance to a maximum of eight feet above
the natural terrain in the area in question
would be unreasonable. If banks can be
maintained above the natural terrain to
any degree within the contemplation of
the easement, I would think that they
could be maintained to the above extent,
depending upon the reasonable necessities as determined by reclamation officials. The pre-trial stipulation and order
accept the necessity for the contemplated
construction, including the banks. There
is no evidence or agreements from which
I could find that the construction and
maintenance of the eight foot banks are
beyond the scope of the easement, and I
find that they are reasonably necessary
to carry out the authorized purposes of
the canal.
Whether the same can be said about
the right to maintain and operate a fifty
foot boom on the top of the banks is a
more difficult question. But before dealing further with this question two preliminary points raised by the Government should be considered.
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Consideration of the issue of enlargement of the heretofore reserved right of
way is not precluded by the pre-trial order. While the matter of enlargement
was not specifically mentioned at the trial
the pre-trial order stipulated by the parties did reserve the question of damages
for any taking. The defendant would not
be precluded from rightfully claiming
damages for a portion of the interest
actually taken although it had asserted
without warrant a right to recover damages for the whole. If the construction
of the canal with ordinary banks and
appurtenances would not amount to a
taking, the maintenance and operation of
the fifty foot boom might; and, if it did,
the question of damages for the taking
of an easement to operate the boom would
be within the purview of the pre-trial
order. The very fact that this case started out and still continues on the face of
the complaint as a pure and simple action
to condemn a right of way without reference to any prior rights now claimed by
the Government does not put the latter
in a very good position now to be technical in excluding from consideration a
resolution of all of the issues necessarily
implied by the subsequent positions of
each party as acquiesced in by the other.
[6] Nor do I think the position of
the Government is correct that damages
otherwise recoverable for an easement to
operate the boom would amount merely to
consequential damages for which the defendant Power Company could not recover for the latter reason. It is true,
that a firm Federal rule denies recovery
of consequential damages unless they are
incidental to an actual taking. United
States v. Willow River Power Co., 324
U.S. 499, 65 S.Ct 761, 89 L.Ed. 1101
(1945); Northern Trans, Co. v. Chicago*
99 U.S. 635,25 L.Ed. 336 (1879); Batten
et aL v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10
Cir. 1962); Harris v. United States, 205
F.2d 765 (10 Cir. 1953). Apart from the
question of whether there already exists
a right of way in favor of the Government for the purpose, the very statement
of the rule and the latest expression of
our Circuit Court in the Batten case

make clear that the claimed enlargement
could not be considered as causing n « f
consequential damage not incidental ^
an actual taking. In Batten, recoveq^
was denied because there was not a phyw
icalM invasion of the air space over Hfcl
claimant's land and no related taking il
the view of the majority of the court;
but over the dissent of Judge Murrak
Compare United States v. Causby, 321
U.S. 256, 66 S.Ct 1062, 90 L.Ed. 1206
(1946), where there was an actual h
sion of the air space above the claimant
land by low flying aircraft and, hence,
compensable taking and a recovery
consequential damages.
^
[7] - If it does not already have
right, the Government really is aakix^
now for an easement to make an extiV
ordinary use of the air space above th#
canal for the operation of the fifty foot
boom. This in substance was the stat*»
ment that the Government attorney
firmed at the last hearing. If it ne
an easement I suppose that no one'
assert that the Government should
pay for i t It would seem to make net
difference, in principle that the additions
easement sought to be obtained extendi
vertically above the banks of the canal
if indeed it is an additional easeme
that must be condemned. But is it?
There is a suggestion in the evidc
that there may be new types of equij£J
ment which could be constructed and
erated without entailing the necessity o£
raising the defendants' lines or that
dredging equipment might be employed^
The preponderance of the evidence, howH
ever, indicates, and I find, that upon the?
basis of equipment in existence the only;
practical way that the canal can be cleaned at present, and certainly the normal;
and reasonable means under current conditions, is to utilize a fifty foot boom with
dragline, the banks of the canal at the
water line being some seventy to ninety;
feet apart, and it being impracticable
because of the construction of the canal
and the necessity of maintaining water in
it almost all of the time to move equip*
ment into the bottom.
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v. I further find for completion of the
•record in the event of appeal that in prder
Ao construct its transmission lines at a
height sufficient to permit the operation
-of such a boom the defendant necessarily
will incur expenses of $8707.00 more than
would be necessary if the transmission
lines were elevated and constructed to
adjust simply to the extra height of the
eight foot banks with requisite safety
margin. Such finding, however, is not
essential to a disposition of the case if
zmy decision stands.
Not without some doubt, I have coneluded, and find, that right to maintain
such a canal in this ordinary and reasonable fashion, including the operation of
the fifty foot boom under existing conditions, is a part of the right and easement
reserved by operation of the original
grant and subsequent conveyances and
the reservation incorporated therein under the law.
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increase the servitude upon the grantor's
property by enlarging on the easement
itself, it is entitled to do what is reasonably necessary for full and proper enjoyment of the rights granted under the
e&sement in the normal development of
the use of the dominant tenement. Kogod v. Cogito, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 284,
2M F.2d 743 (1952); Pitsenbarger v.
Northern Natural Gas Co., 198 F.Supp.
665 (D.C.S.D.Iowa 1961); Williams v.
Northern Natural Gas Company, 136 F.
Supp. 514, (D.CN.D.Iowa 1955) App.
Dis., 8 Cir., 235 F.2d 782; Laden v. Atkeson, 112 Mont 302, 116 P.2d 881
(1941); Holm v. Davis, 41 Utah 200,
125 P. 403, 44 L.R.A.,N.S., 89 (1912);
17A AmJur. Easements § 129 pp. 737739; 5 Restatement, Property, § 484
(1944) p. 3020; cf. Stalcup v. Cameron
Ditch Company, 130 Mont. 294, 300 P.2d
511 (1956).

The last line of inquiry at the last
It must be acknowledged that at the hearing,9 which was not discussed in
time of the original reservation such counsels statements, presents a final
equipment as a fifty foot boom and drag- problem that at least must be noted.
line for the purpose of cleaning canals In response to a question by the court,
was not a usual thing, and may not even a witness for the Government testified
have been in use at all. Such an opera- that the canal in his judgment would
tion was not one that could be deemed un- have to be cleaned about every ten years.
contemplated in principle. As a matter Assuming that construction is not now
of fact, a one hundred foot wide canal complete, then, it may be more than ten
probably was not ordinary construction years before there will be any occasion
in those days. It probably was not con* to use the boom. While I have found
templated that such a canal as the one with some assurance that the use of that
in question here would run water both boom would be reasonably necessary to
ways—in the summer by means of pump- clean the canal if it had to be cleaned uning from the canal and during the non- der existing conditions, what the situairrigation seasons into the canal. But tion will be ten or fifteen years hence in
if we must limit construction or mainte- view of the prospective changes in equipnance within the protection of the ease- ment and procedures as suggested by the
ment to exactly what was well known or evidence is somewhat uncertain.
practiced then, the basically continuing
The Government insists that it need
purpose of the reservation would be
not pay for any additional right to opfrustrated.
erate the boom. If it thus relies exclu[8] The right reasonably to main- sively upon the existing easement, rather
tain such a canal, including the right to than condemnation, it is under continuoperate the fifty foot boom if reasonably ing obligation to avoid unnecessary innecessary under existing conditions, jury to the servient estate. Brown &
must be considered to be included in the Root, Inc. v. United States, 116 F.Supp.
reserved easement. The general rule is 732. 126 Ct.Cl. 684 (1953); Laden v.
that while an easement holder may not AUcison, 112 Mont 802, 116 P.2d 881
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(1941); Holm v. Davis, 41 Utah 200,125
P. 403, 44 LR.A.fN.S., 89 (1912); 17A
Am.Jur. Easements § 130 p. 739. And it
is entirely possible that the use of the
boom ten or fifteen years hence will needlessly inflict injury upon the Power Company.
Should I accede to the Government's
insistence that I recognize its claimed
rights without making an award on the
theory that an additional easement to
operate the boom is sought, it necessarily
would be, it seems, the confirmation of
the right to operate the boom under existing conditions, not precluding a later
claim under changed conditions that its
operation then would be the subjugation
of the servient estate to unnecessary injury and thus an enlargement of the
existing easement On the other hand,
the dilemma of the Power Company too
is perplexing for it must determine the
height of its lines in the near future to
permit early installation; and if it doea
not adjust its construction program to
the possibility that the operation of the
boom in the future will continue a reasonably necessary exercise of the existing
easement of the Government, it will be
proceeding at its peril.
Having already permitted the parties
to reopen once, I fear that there still is
insufficient evidence, or even specific issues reflected in the pleadings or pretrial order before me, to make possible a
solution of this refined dilemma. It may
be that by their respective positions, and
the implied mues acquiesced in, the parties may be confronted unavoidably with
the problem as a part of the practical
context of the case. Perhaps it is one
of those inbuilt possibilities that should
be disregarded by me as the parties have
chosen to disregard it in their prior submissions. And perhaps it commends, as
I endeavored to suggest in exploring the
possibilities of some practical adjustment
at the last hearing, further thoughts and
efforts toward a practical solution between the parties.
The foregoing opinion, together with
the recitation of uncontroverted facts set

out in the pre-trial order submitted M
the parties, is deemed sufficient as AMI
ings of fact and conclusions of law. fa
view of the situation last mentioned, honk
ever, it is directed that a form of pra
posed decree not inconsistent with thif
opinion be prepared by counsel for the;
Government, and, if the form is not
agreed to by the parties, settled upon at
least five days notice on one of my regr*lar rule days.

